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ABSTRACT 
As EPA rolls out controversial regulations on power plant 
emissions of greenhouse gases, a vocal group of legislators, industry 
groups, and legal and economic scholars are crying foul, arguing EPA 
didn’t “follow the rules” when it conducted its cost-benefit analyses of 
these regulations. 
This article traces the origin of these cost-benefit rules, finding that 
the methodological handbook alleged to be the “worldwide gold 
standard” was actually developed through a fundamentally flawed 
process, one that intentionally excluded majority viewpoints in several 
relevant academic disciplines.  Unsurprisingly, it also contains serious 
methodological mistakes.  If these mistakes were to be applied to 
regulations addressing domestic greenhouse gas emissions (that is, if 
EPA and other executive agencies do “follow the rules,” as demanded 
by the critics of these regulations in Congress, academia and regulated 
industry), this injection of both outright irrationality and arguably 
unethical subjective biases into domestic regulatory policy would 
threaten to derail substantive U.S. action on climate change. 
This article also describes how the executive order that spawned 
these rules is impossible to comply with literally, because it creates a 
series of “max/min” problems with no common solution.  This creates 
a conundrum that, over and over again, is resolved under these cost-
benefit rules in favor of maximizing quantifiable, monetized “net 
benefits,” at the expense of promoting a set of competing yet also 
important rights- and duty-based factors that the text of the parent 
executive order ostensibly puts on equal footing. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. General Background on the Human Impacts of the Cost-Benefit 
Analysis Approach to Climate Change Regulation 
 
When a powerful storm destroyed her riverside home in 2009, 
Jahanara Khatun lost more than the modest roof over her head.  In 
the aftermath, her husband died and she became so destitute that 
she sold her son and daughter into bonded servitude . . .   
 
She spends her days collecting cow dung for fuel and struggling to 
grow vegetables in soil poisoned by salt water.  Climate scientists 
predict that this area will be inundated as sea levels rise and storm 
surges increase . . . .  But Ms. Khatun is trying to hold out at least 
for a while—one of millions living on borrowed time in this vast 
landscape of river islands, bamboo huts, heartbreaking choices and 
impossible hopes.1 
 
Human-caused climate change causes tens of thousands of deaths 
worldwide each year.  This death rate, along with rates of other 
human health impacts, is virtually certain to increase over time.2 The 
United States—though recently dethroned by China as the world’s 
largest carbon dioxide emitter—remains among the largest carbon 
dioxide emitters per capita.3  Because carbon dioxide pollution can 
 
 1. Gardiner Harris, As Seas Rise, Millions Cling to Borrowed Time and Dying Land, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2014, at A1. 
 2. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HEALTH: FACT SHEET NO. 
266 (2013), available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs266/en/ (projecting 250,000 
additional deaths each year from 2030 to 2050); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS: CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, 
AND VULNERABILITY, 11–14, available at http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WG2AR5_ 
SPM_FINAL.pdf (anticipating species extinction, increased food scarcity, and reduction in 
water resources). 
 3. Freya Roberts, 2012’s Carbon Emissions in Five Graphs, THE CARBON BRIEF (Nov. 1, 
2013, 2:10 PM), http://www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2013/11/2012s-carbon-emissions-in-five-graphs/ 
15_Luttrell_PublishedVersion (Do Not Delete) 1/15/2015  6:05 PM 
134 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXV:131 
 
persist in the environment for hundreds or even thousands of years,4 
the United States remains responsible for the largest share of 
increased carbon dioxide currently in the world’s air, oceans, and 
soil.5 
The executive branch is attempting to address climate change by 
pressing a controversial domestic agenda and putting the U.S. on 
track to take a leadership role at the crucial international negotiations 
scheduled for Paris in 2015. The Obama administration’s relevant 
proposed and finalized regulations include conservation regulations, 
fuel economy standards, and limits on pollution from power plants.6  
The administration has also championed subsidies for solar and wind 
energy, among other non-regulatory energy policy measures.7 
Stories like that of Ms. Khatun, above, make patent the 
destruction imposed by the United States and other large-scale 
emitters onto poor countries that are ill-equipped to cope with these 
harms; these human scale accounts tend to create an impetus to act.8  
 
(“In the US, emissions per capita were 16.4 tonnes, and just behind came oil-rich Saudi Arabia 
with per capita emissions of 16.2 tonnes.  The EU and China—both major emitters in absolute 
terms—had much smaller per capita emissions, at 7.4 and 7.1 tonnes respectively.”); Louise 
Watt, US, China Take Small Steps Toward Fighting Climate Change, but Differ on Global Plan, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (July 9, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/business/ 
articles/2014/07/09/ china-us-differ-on-global-plan-to-cut-emissions. 
 4. Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the 
Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for a 
Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43, 50 (2009). 
 5. James Hansen et al., Dangerous Human-Made Interference with Climate: A GISS 
ModelE Study, 7 ATMOS. CHEM. PHYS. 2287, 2303 (2007). 
 6. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 6, 
8, 11 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27 
sclimateactionplan.pdf. 
 7. Id. at 19–20; see also Tony Barboza, Obama-Appointed Climate Change Task Force 
Meets in Los Angeles, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/ 
la-sci-sn-climate-change-task-force-obama-brown-garcetti—20140213-story.html#axzz2tGQ 
jJkKT (recounting Obama administration officials’ discussions on improving disaster response, 
use of federal transportation funding, electrical grid upgrades, and renewable energy financing); 
Coral Davenport, White House Announces 7 Regional Climate Hubs, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2014), 
at A13 (detailing the administration’s creation of “climate hubs” to assist rural communities in 
responding to the risks of climate change). 
 8. See CASS SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 152 (2013) [hereinafter 
SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER] (explaining that, “[i]f something bad happens and is memorable,” its 
occurrence may motivate citizens to move for “aggressive regulation” in response); see also 
ALEX RANDALL, JO SALSBURY, & ZACH WHITE, CLIMATE OUTREACH & INFO. NETWORK, 
MOVING STORIES: THE VOICES OF PEOPLE WHO MOVE IN THE CONTEXT OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE (2014), available at http://climatemigration.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/MovingStories.pdf (collecting first-person accounts of the effect of 
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But framing the narrative as one of aggregate risk serves to suppress 
this instinct, and further reducing estimates of aggregate risks to mere 
inputs into a larger cost-benefit analysis (CBA) moves the narrative 
even further away from the human instinct to protect vulnerable 
people in well-publicized danger and closer to what some argue is a 
better, more rational position from which to make policy decisions.9 
For example, in his remarks from the Senate floor criticizing an 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposal to reduce 
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), like carbon dioxide, from 
existing power plants, Senator John Cornyn said: 
 
I wish to clarify once again that the debate over President Obama’s 
EPA rule is not about the science of climate change; it is a debate 
about whether massive regulations should be forced to pass a 
simple cost-benefit analysis. The EPA rule clearly fails that test.10 
 
While EPA and other agencies have developed regulations on 
GHGs, and President Obama has pressed other elements of his 
“Climate Action Plan,” many Members of Congress have taken a 
tack similar to that of Senator Cornyn. They explain that they oppose 
proposals to reduce GHG emissions, not necessarily because they 
deny the underlying science or lack concern for people who will be 
harmed by climate change, but—at least in part—because they are 




 9. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 683, 753 (1999) (explaining how cost-benefit analysis can “serve as a check on ill-
advised availability campaigns”); but see Cass Sunstein, People Don’t Fear Climate Change 
Enough, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Aug. 27, 2013, 9:11 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/ 
2013-08-27/people-don-t-fear-climate-change-enough (explaining that, because climate change 
is not necessarily directly linked to isolated and memorable disasters, people are not as driven to 
“outrage” as by other, more distinct risks or hazards). 
 10. 160 CONG. REC. S3354, S3355–56 (2014) (statement of Sen. John Cornyn). 
 11. See, e.g., 160 CONG. REC. H1649, H1654 (2014) (statement of Rep. Bob Latta) (“[T]he 
EPA has put forward broad-reaching regulatory proposals that are either unachievable or lack 
sufficient cost-benefit justifications.  One of the most harmful proposals includes the greenhouse 
gas emission standards for new power plants that aim to stop the use of coal as an energy 
source.”); Id. at H1650 (statement of  Rep. Vicky Hartzler) (“Congressional intent in the Clean 
Air Act is clear. The EPA is required to complete a cost-benefit analysis and base their 
regulations on the best commercially available technology. It is clear that these standards have 
not been met.”); see also 160 CONG. REC. H6049, H6053 (2014) (statement of Rep. James 
Lankford) (arguing for abandoning the use of a social cost model for carbon emissions, which 
was created behind closed-doors, without public input); 160 CONG. REC. S3900, S3900–01 
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There exists an enormous body of scholarship on CBA.12  To the 
extent a portion of it, by accident or by design, is currently helping to 
prop up such arguments against climate action, this scholarship’s 
merits are of deadly serious concern because of what is at stake.  
According to the latest report from the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), if current emissions trends continue, a 
temperature increase of 4.1° to 4.8° C (about 7.4° to 8.6° F) by 2100 is 
likely.13  Under one plausible reductions scenario, where rates of 
global carbon dioxide-equivalent emissions are reduced to stay 11% 
to 17% below 2010 rates through 2050, and then drop to 21% to 54% 
below 2010 rates from 2050 through 2100, a rise in average mean 
temperature of 2.6° to 2.9° C (about 4.7° to 5.2° F) is still predicted.14 
Even under the latter scenario, IPCC scientists are confident that 
climate change impacts will include increasing deaths and diseases 
from devastating heat waves, droughts, floods, wildfires, disrupted 
food production and water supply, damaged infrastructure, and 
destroyed human settlements.15  At issue is real, human devastation 
on an utterly massive scale.16  Unfortunately, however, climate change 
is a policy problem that is particularly incompatible with the United 
States’ current emphasis on CBA in regulatory policy. 
 The economic foundations of the type of regulatory CBA 
practiced in the U.S. technically require that it be used only when the 
projects under evaluation will not have a large impact on the 
economy.  Although the United States has been side-stepping this 
fundamental principle for years, evaluating major climate regulations 
 
(2014) (statement of Sen. Jeff Flake) (condemning the EPA’s current approach as “arbitrary, 
cumbersome,” and “a violation of common sense”). 
 12. Don Bradford Hardin, Jr., Why Cost-Benefit Analysis? A Question (and Some 
Answers) About the Legal Academy, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1135, 1179 (2008) (detailing an increase in 
CBA scholarship). 
 13. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR 
POLICYMAKERS, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 9–13, available at 
http://report.mitigation2014.org/spm/ipcc_wg3_ar5_summary-for-policymakers_approved.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 26, 2014). 
 14. Id. at 12. 
 15. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR 
POLICYMAKERS, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 7, available at 
http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf (last visited Dec. 
26, 2014) (projecting that climate change problems are “virtually certain” to increase). 
 16.   See id. (finding, inter alia, that “[w]arming of the climate system is unequivocal, and 
since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. 
The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea 
level has risen, and the concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased.”). 
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using current, standardized regulatory CBA methodologies violates 
this principle in a more dramatic fashion than ever in our history. 
To explain: CBA is a branch of applied microeconomics that—in 
an effort to enhance welfare, utility, or some similar social objective—
applies some of the same economic assumptions applicable to  a firm 
or household more broadly.  However, nothing could be larger, more 
macro, than the global climate.  Using microeconomic insights to 
inform more “macro” regulatory decisions may be attractive when a 
regulatory alternative (as with a proposal relating to a single firm that 
has little influence on the larger economy) will have little impact on 
any factors external to the microeconomic analysis.  But the further 
the actual facts move from this assumption, the less helpful such 
microeconomic models become to real-world decision makers.  
CBAs, because they rely on estimates of “partial equilibrium 
analyses,” assume any  factors not under assessment will remain 
unaffected while the set of moving pieces actually under analysis are 
evaluated.17  However, performing valid partial equilibrium analyses 
(or even making defensible estimates) is not even theoretically 
possible when the condition of the entire, populated planet centuries 
into the future is one of the moving pieces.18  National energy and 
climate policy seem particularly unsuited for a sort of accounting that 
depends on a number of external factors to remain the same, no 
matter what action is or isn’t taken.  Unfortunately, despite this 
fundamental incompatibility, CBA is playing a key role in the current 
debate.  Thus, it is necessary to examine the merits of the relevant 
methodological arguments.  For example, is it true that EPA’s 
proposed rule for existing power plant emissions “fail” CBA, as many 
Members of Congress have claimed?19  Or does EPA get it right when 
 
 17. See RICHARD E. JUST ET AL., THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY 45–47 
(2004) (describing partial equilibrium analysis and explaining that a partial equilibrium analysis 
approach is useful, but requires focusing on one factor at a time and assuming that all other 
factors are unaffected). 
 18. C.f. Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 
47 (2011) (“[I]magine the pursuit of social welfare maximization as being akin to climbing a 
mountain. Partial equilibrium analysis offers narrow technical advice on how best to climb that 
mountain . . . .  Nowhere in the analysis, however, is the question posed, ‘Are we on the right 
mountain?’”). 
 19. See supra note 11; see also Determining the Proper Scope of Climate Change Benefits, 
BROOKINGS INST. (June 4, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/06/04-
determining-proper-scope-climate-change-benefits-gayer (“[A] new working paper from Ted 
Gayer and Kip Viscusi suggests that the EPA’s methodology for calculating the benefit 
represents a shift away from typical practice.  A more traditional cost-benefit analysis would 
estimate climate benefits of only $2 billion to $7 billion—less than the estimated compliance 
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its CBA estimates that these regulations will result in billions of 
dollars in net social welfare benefits?20  Given the number of value 
judgments involved in producing these assessments,21 and given the 
shaky foundation upon which this endeavor rests,22 there can be no 
objectively correct answer to these questions.  What can be shown, 
though, and what this article establishes, is that CBA provides no 
rational justification for putting the brakes on climate change 
regulations.  To the extent these welfare analyses do tell us anything 
useful, they counsel that we are waiting too long to do too little.  To 
put it back into human terms, the United States’ inertia—its 
attachment to existing, flawed policy and to existing, irrational tactics 
for regulatory analysis—is imperiling hundreds of millions of lives of 
real people like Ms. Khatun. 
B. How Mistakes in an Arcane CBA Methodological Handbook Fuel 
Opposition to Climate Change Regulations 
The foundation for some of these claims that climate change 
proposals “fail” CBA—and the corollary claim that these proposals 
would fail CBA if only agency economists would “follow the rules” of 
CBA—can be found in an obscure 2003 handbook created by George 
W. Bush’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  These 
guidelines, titled “OMB Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis,” 
(colloquially, A-4) establish methodologies agencies must use in the 
Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) they must prepare for major 
rules subject to OMB-supervised regulatory review.23 
 
cost[.]”) (citing TED GAYER & W. KIP VISCUSI, DETERMINING THE PROPER SCOPE OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE BENEFITS 3–4 (June 3, 2014), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/ 
media/research/files/papers/2014/06/04%20determining%20proper%20scope%20climate%20ch
ange%20benefits%20gayer/04_determining_proper_scope_climate_change_benefits.pdf). 
 20. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 
60). 
 21. Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1557, 1596–99 (2011) (summarizing the various judgments required 
for cost-benefit analysis and their potential for arbitrariness). 
 22. Douglas A. Kysar, Politics By Other Meanings: A Comment On “Retaking Rationality 
Two Years Later,” 48 HOUS. L. REV. 43, 68 (2011) (“Invariably, cost-benefit analyses of 
proposed regulations are dense, jargony, and opaque; inevitably they contain moments deep 
within their technical details in which the analyst masks a critical value choice through a 
methodological maneuver . . . .  [And the foundational value questions] are typically treated by 
cost-benefit proponents as matters of elite expertise or disciplinary orthodoxy, rather than 
debatable moral and political issues.”). 
 23. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4: REGULATORY ANALYSIS (2003) 
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When EPA’s claims about the welfare impacts of a rule are 
inconsistent with A-4, critics argue that EPA’s estimates are bogus.24  
For example, in response to a request from Senator David Vitter and 
Representative Darrell Issa, the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) released a report in July 2014 assessing “how EPA has 
used economic analyses in its decision making during the rulemaking 
process and the extent to which EPA adhered to OMB guidance in 
conducting selected elements of the economic analyses the agency 
used to support recent rulemakings.”25  To meet this objective, GAO 
studied seven EPA rulemakings and “assessed them against key 
principles outlined in OMB Circular A-4,” ultimately finding that 
EPA did not always follow the guidelines contained in A-4.26  
Predictably, this finding that EPA did not comply fully with A-4 has 
fueled claims that EPA’s proposed new climate change regulations 
are themselves deeply flawed.27 
There has even been legislation introduced in the House that 
would specifically require EPA to follow A-4 in new analyses of 
 
[hereinafter OMB CIRCULAR A-4]; see also OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 
AGENCY CHECKLIST: REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/RIA_Checklist.pdf 
[hereinafter RIA CHECKLIST].  Though some of these papers may not be published in academic 
journals, they have proven powerful on Capitol Hill, undergirding the positions of opponents of 
mandatory GHG reductions.  See, e.g., The ‘Social Cost of Carbon:’ Some Surprising Facts: 
Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of 
Robert P. Murphy, Senior Economist, Institute for Energy Research); U.S. CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE: INST. FOR 21ST CENTURY ENERGY, ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF POTENTIAL NEW 
CARBON REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (2014), available at 
http://www.energyxxi.org/sites/default/files/file-tool/Assessing_the_Impact_of_Potential_New_ 
Carbon_Regulations_in_the_United_States.pdf; Robert P. Murphy, Power Plant Rule Fails 
Administration’s Own Cost/Benefit Test, INST. FOR ENERGY RESEARCH (Jun. 2, 2014), 
http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/power-plant-rule-fails-administrations-costbenefit-
test/#. 
 24. Issa, Vitter: GAO Report Confirms EPA Fudges Costs of Regulations, COMM. ON 
OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM (Aug. 11, 2014), http://oversight.house.gov/release/issa-vitter-
gao-report-confirms-epa-fudges-costs-regulations/ [hereinafter Issa, Vitter] (Representative Issa 
contends that the “Obama Administration failed to provide thorough, transparent cost-benefit 
analyses for major environmental rules that cost American jobs” and that “EPA pushed 
through regulations using sloppy analysis[.]” Senator Vitter claims the GAO report 
demonstrated problems with “EPA’s methodologies for claiming health and employment 
impacts, both of which they are fudging[.]”). 
 25. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-14-519, ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION: EPA SHOULD IMPROVE ADHERENCE TO GUIDANCE FOR SELECTED 
ELEMENTS OF REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSES 3 (2014), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/670/664872.pdf. 
 26. Id. at 3–4, 10. 
 27. Issa, Vitter, supra note 24; see also S. Res. 512, 113th Cong. (2014) (devoting four pages 
to complaints over the EPA’s proposed rules for carbon pollution emission guidelines). 
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EPA’s Clean Power Plan.  The Clean Power Plan sets GHG 
emissions limits for new and existing power plants.28 
The cachet of A-4 is bolstered by continued favorable treatment 
by many in the legal academy, including such prominent CBA 
scholars as Professors Cass Sunstein29 and Kip Viscusi30 (who also 
happen to have been among the seven peer reviewers of A-4).31  
While this scholarly work may not support climate inaction directly—
Cass Sunstein was personally involved in approving some of the GHG 
regulations and policies at issue in the current debate32—academic 
support for applying flawed A-4 directives to regulations, including 
GHG regulations, is lending credibility to overtly political anti-
regulatory rhetoric that relies on A-4.33 
Much of the current confusion over the appropriate way to 
conduct a regulatory CBA derives from the executive order that 
spawned A-4, an executive order that is impossible to comply with 
literally (see discussion in Part IV, below).  This still-operative 
Clinton-era order, Executive Order 12,866, “Regulatory Planning and 
Review,” requires executive agencies to prepare regulatory impact 
analyses (RIAs) for a centralized review overseen by OMB’s Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).34  When George W. 
Bush’s OMB initially issued Circular A-4 in 2003, this represented a 
move away from considering deontological values in RIAs (explicitly 
required under President Clinton’s executive order), and a shift 
toward giving heavier weight to formalistic CBA results. 
The stated purpose of A-4 is to implement the language in E.O. 
12,866 that calls for assessing projected costs and benefits.35  But E.O. 
12,866 also requires evaluating and optimizing numerous other 
considerations, some of which are incompatible with even this “soft” 
 
 28. H.R. 2948, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 29. Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Cost-Benefit Analysis: Thirty-Six Questions (and 
Almost as Many Answers), 114 COLUM. L. REV. 167, 172–73 (2014) [hereinafter Sunstein, 
Thirty-Six Questions]. 
 30. GAYER & VISCUSI, supra note 19, at 13. 
 31. OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 1. 
 32. Sunstein, Thirty-Six Questions, supra note 29, at 171. 
 33. E.g., 160 CONG. REC. H1649, H1650 (2014) (statement of Rep. Vicky Hartzler); Issa, 
Vitter, supra note 24. 
 34. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).  A closely related 
Executive Order issued by President Obama “is supplemental to and reaffirms” E.O. 12,866’s 
regulatory analysis provisions.  Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011). 
 35. OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 1. 
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CBA decision criterion.  The Order sets out a series of irreconcilable 
“max/min” problems with no common solution, a series of directives 
to do the impossible, i.e., to identify the single solution that 
maximizes or minimizes multiple competing variables all at once.  For 
analysts producing RIAs under A-4, it creates a conundrum that, over 
and over again, is resolved in favor of maximizing quantifiable, 
monetized “net benefits” (to the extent this is consistent with the 
agency’s mandate), at the expense of promoting other conflicting yet 
also important duty- and rights-based factors that the text of the 
executive order puts on equal footing with the consequentialist 
concerns addressed by CBA. 
This problem was exacerbated when, in one of his first major 
moves after becoming OIRA Administrator in 2009, Professor Cass 
Sunstein issued a memorandum to agencies calling for even more 
rigid adherence to A-4 than was required under the George W. Bush 
administration that created it.36  The increasing ascendancy of A-4 
results in E.O. 12,866-implementation in a way that gives insufficient 
influence to the ethical, deontological concerns expressly recognized 
as deserving protection by the language of that executive order. 
Furthermore, A-4 is deeply flawed even when considered only as 
a tool for achieving its consequentialist objective to identify 
regulatory options that maximize net social welfare. It instructs 
agencies to use a set of estimation procedures that, on the whole, are 
biased against protective regulations, especially regulations whose 
benefits accrue in the future and which are harder to quantify.37  For 
example, A-4 requires that regulatory benefits that will accrue in the 
future must be reported using a very high discount rate, one that 
commentators almost universally describe as too high even while 
OMB specifies more correct, lower rates to be used in other types of 
analyses.38  One might ask why OMB would not just allow but actually 
 
 36. See OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: A 
PRIMER (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/ 
circular-a-4_regulatory-impact-analysis-a-primer.pdf  (reiterating and expounding the 
requirements which Circular A-4 places upon agencies). 
 37. David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335, 400 
(2006) (CBA “has thwarted environmental protection completely”) [hereinafter Driesen, Is 
Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?]; Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of 
Health, Safety and Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 2042 (2002) (CBA cost 
estimates are consistently too high because they are made by regulated entities). 
 38. See Melissa J. Luttrell, The Case for Differential Discounting: How a Small Rate Change 
Could Help Agencies Save More Lives and Make More Sense, 3 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 80, 
115 [hereinafter Luttrell, Differential Discounting] (discussing OMB’s explanation for applying 
different discount rates for different kinds of benefits); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
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mandate CBA methodologies that are fringe positions in the field of 
mainstream welfare economics (excluding the un-peer reviewed, self-
published work produced by regulatory think tanks, much of it 
funded in some way by regulated industry itself)?  The answer may lie 
in the fact that many of the erroneous and subjectively biased 
methodologies now enshrined in A-4 date back to the Reagan era, 
when the preferred methodologies of overtly anti-regulatory interests 
were promoted by OMB and imposed to varying degrees on agencies 
for the express purpose of slowing them down.39 
Unfortunately, despite all A-4’s defects and limitations, over 
time it has come to be regarded by many as the “worldwide gold 
standard” of applied regulatory analysis.40  Supporters of robust 
agency CBA requirements, including former OIRA administrators 
under Republican and Democratic administrations, endorse A-4 as 
being produced under rigorous peer review and a public comment 
process.41  They also claim it reflects the mainstream consensus among 
relevant experts.42 
However, the process by which A-4 was prepared did not include 
“notice and comment” in the sense that phrase is traditionally used 
for rulemakings under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).  A 
crucial difference is that in APA rulemakings the rulemaking agency 
must provide a reasonable, non-arbitrary response to commenters or 
face possible legal consequences for moving forward in the face of 
commenter criticism.43  Here, no such requirement was imposed. 
 
CIRCULAR NO. A-94, 8–9 (1992), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a094#8; 
see infra notes 108–119 and accompanying text. 
 39. See Heritage Foundation Report: Reagan Team’s Blueprint to EPA, 53 WATER 
POLLUTION CONTROL FED’N 16, 16–17 (1981) (promoting “full decentralization” of decision-
making processes); see also Luttrell, Differential Discounting, supra note 38, at 81−82; JAMES 
MILLER, FIX THE U.S. BUDGET!: URGINGS OF AN “ABOMINABLE NO-MAN” 2 (1994); Thomas 
O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 58 (1998) [hereinafter McGarity, A 
Cost-Benefit State]; Lawrence Mosher, Reaganites, with OMB’s List in Hand, Take Dead Aim at 
EPA’s Regulations, 13 NAT’L 256, 256 (1981) (James C. Miller III, head of the OMB office that 
compiled an analysis of environmental regulations by EPA stated “[w]e’re going to be putting 
down very hard rules for them.”). 
 40. Videotape: Administrative Conference of the United States: Committee on Regulation 
(Apr. 29, 2013 at 1:40:33), http://acus.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=82 
(statement of Susan Dudley). 
 41. Id. at 1:40:23; John D. Graham, Valuing the Future: OMB’s Refined Position, 74 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 51, 51 (2007); see Sunstein, Thirty-Six Questions, supra note 29, at 201 (considering A-4 
“binding, because it reflects the official position of the U.S. government”). 
 42. OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 21. 
 43. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., RULEMAKING REQUIREMENTS 9 (Apr. 2011), available at 
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Similarly, its proponents claim A-4 is reliable because it is “peer 
reviewed,” but the process used was grossly inadequate. Though the 
peer reviewers were well-regarded scholars, they represented a very 
narrow set of viewpoints, and many of them had real or apparent 
conflicts of interest.44  Furthermore, there was never a requirement 
that Circular A-4 actually had to satisfy these peer reviewers.45 
As the Obama administration implements its “Climate Action 
Plan,” it will rely on A-4 methodologies to complete CBAs of major 
climate regulations.  To incorporate the monetized value of climate 
benefits and costs into these CBAs, agencies will rely on the 
administration’s controversial Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) estimates.  
The oft-repeated criticism that the SCC is too high because it 
arguably was derived in a way inconsistent with two A-4 
methodological guidelines (ones that would have reduced the SCC by 
reducing the weight given to future beneficiaries and to people 
outside the United States) is flawed in substance since these are 
legitimate concerns for regulatory analyses.  This critique is also 
procedurally flawed to the extent it assumes any executive agency 
obligation to comply with this flawed set of OMB guidelines that 
were never officially promulgated as a rule or enacted as a law.  
Moreover, had the SCC been derived using certain other, more 
reasonable OMB methodologies that were not followed—such as the 
requests to use appropriate values for human lives and to use a logical 
baseline—the SCC estimates would have been even higher. 
Part II of this article describes regulatory analysis, including the 
enhanced role of A-4, under the Obama administration.  Part III 
explains why E.O. 12,866 is incoherent; I argue, however, that even 
given the impossibility of literally implementing all of E.O. 12,866’s 
inconsistent directives, OIRA errs in emphasizing CBA to the extent 
it does.  Part IV contends that A-4 contains substantive 
methodological flaws that have a significant impact on regulations 
and explains how A-4 was created through a flawed process.  Part V 
argues that the legal scholars, lobbyists, and government policy 
makers (including some Members of Congress) who criticize the SCC 
 
http://www.dot.gov/sites/dot.dev/files/docs/Value%20of%20Travel%20Time.pdf; see also 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (“[T]he agency shall give interested 
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, 
views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.  After consideration of 
the relevant material presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise 
general statement of their basis and purpose.”). 
 44. See infra notes 126, 135 and accompanying text. 
 45. See infra p. 167. 
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for considering the impacts of externalizing emissions onto other 
countries and for its failure to use an after-inflation (real) discount 
rate of 7%, err in claiming that these SCC numbers are illegitimate 
for not “following the rules” as laid out in A-4.  It also identifies 
OMB guidelines not followed that would have increased the SCC.  
Part VI concludes that A-4 is producing misleading results and that 
compliance with A-4 should no longer be a required part of the 
regulatory review process for any regulation, especially regulations 
targeting climate change. 
II. THE AMPLIFIED ROLE OF OMB METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINES 
ON REGULATORY ANALYSIS UNDER PRESIDENT OBAMA 
Professor Sunstein, who is among the most cited and respected 
legal scholars in the United States, served as President Obama’s first 
“regulatory czar.”  In that position he established an architecture of 
regulatory review for this administration.  While there are competing 
narratives on the subject of how intrusive President Obama’s OIRA 
has become in the rulemaking process, there is agreement on the 
point that A-4 has become significantly more influential than it was 
under the George W. Bush administration that created A-4.  
Required adherence to formalistic methodological requirements has 
significantly increased since President Clinton issued E.O. 12,866 in 
1993. 
OIRA has been criticized on multiple fronts since acquiring its 
current role in the regulatory review apparatus in the 1980s.  OIRA 
has been likened to a regulatory black hole that often delays and 
rejects proposed regulations before the public even has an 
opportunity to review them.  OIRA has also been attacked for 
requiring agencies to engage in analyses that serve as a “one-way 
ratchet,” systematically weakening public health and environmental 
regulations.46 
OIRA-overseen regulatory review, if cynically used to enable a 
 
 46. David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety 
Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 74 (2005); see Michael A. Livermore, Cause or Cure? Cost-Benefit 
Analysis and Regulatory Gridlock, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 107, 109 (2008) (describing 
longstanding concerns of environmentalists and “pro-regulatory groups” that cost-benefit 
analysis was “code for deregulation”); see also Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, supra 
note 37, at 347–48 (2006) (describing the EPA’s inability to regulate asbestos, despite clear 
health concerns). 
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president to avoid direct accountability for his or her unwillingness to 
let an agency proceed, has few—if any—defenders on public policy 
grounds.  The legal legitimacy of this OIRA action does have 
defenders.47  But OIRA qua rational regulatory reviewer, on the one 
hand, and centralized inter-agency policy coordinator, on the other, 
finds numerous champions in the literature.48 
When it is performing this more widely-accepted “regulatory 
analysis” role, OIRA insists agencies follow the cost-benefit 
methodologies enumerated in Circular A-4.49  In describing the 
regulatory review process, Professor Sunstein writes: 
 
[T]he most difficult problems appear quite rarely, and when they 
do, the executive branch usually has standardized methods for 
handling them. These methods are often captured in authoritative 
documents that are both meant and understood to bind executive 
agencies even though they lack the force of law (in the sense that 
they set out purely internal requirements and hence cannot be used 
in court). The Office of Management and Budget’s Circular A-4, 
issued in 2003, is the formal, binding guidance document that 
governs the analysis of regulatory impacts, and it outlines many of 
those standardized methods. (It is noteworthy that Circular A-4 was 
issued in the George W. Bush Administration and continues in the 
Obama Administration; its longevity attests to its technical 
character.)50 
 
But A-4 is not merely a “technical” document.  The 
methodological prescriptions within it reflect decades of lobbying and 
political wrangling.51  Choices that were controversial in 1981 may 
appear more settled in 2014; this is because proponents of a certain 
variety of cost-benefit analysis won a political battle, not because 
 
 47. See Sunstein, Thirty-Six Questions, supra note 29, at 172–73 (explaining that A-4 is 
binding, and that difficult problems only “rarely” arise, for which there are “standardized 
methods”). 
 48. E.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2327–28 
(2001). 
 49. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011) (requiring regulatory system 
to account for costs and benefits, based on “the best available science”); see also RIA 
CHECKLIST, supra note 23 (supporting the proposition that A-4 operationalizes E.O. 12,866 and 
emphasizing importance of analyzing costs and benefits). 
 50. Sunstein, Thirty-Six Questions, supra note 29, at 172–73 (emphasis added). 
 51. For examples of initially controversial anti-regulation biases benefitting regulated 
industry that have persisted in OMB’s methodological guidelines since the Reagan 
administration,see Luttrell, Differential Discounting, supra note 38, at 82 n.9. 
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there has been a true meeting of the minds on strictly technical 
matters after a robust debate in the relevant literatures.52  Entrenched 
is not the same as correct. 
In 2011, President Obama issued a new executive order on 
regulatory review, E.O. 13,563, which explicitly re-affirms and does 
not amend E.O. 12,866.53  The key rules at issue in the suite of rules 
that will comprise the Obama administration’s climate regulations 
will be “significant regulatory action[s]” (the trigger for mandatory 
OIRA cost-benefit review under the Order) within the meaning of 
E.O. 12,866.54  Interestingly, however, most rules reviewed by OIRA 
today are not in any obvious way “significant regulatory action[s]” 
that require OIRA review at all.55  This appears to go against 
President Clinton’s intention when he initially signed E.O. 12,866 and 
explained that regulatory review would be “dramatically different” 
and that many fewer regulations would be subjected to a review.56 
Since leaving his post as OIRA Administrator, Professor 
Sunstein has produced a flurry of scholarship describing and 
defending the OIRA-overseen regulatory review process.57  The 
 
 52. Id. at 82, 127–28. 
 53. Its key addition was a directive to the agencies to conduct retrospective reviews of 
regulation, a directive not at issue here.  See generally Exec. Order No. 13,563, 78 Fed. Reg. 
3821 (Jan. 18, 2011).  To ensure compliance with the cost-benefit provisions of E.O. 13,563, 
agencies are referred to A-4, the same manual that operationalizes CBA under Exec. Order No. 
12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51.735 (Jan. 21, 2012).  RIA CHECKLIST, supra note 23. 
 54. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
 55. See CURTIS COPELAND, LENGTH OF RULE REVIEWS BY THE OFFICE OF 
INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS 52 (2013), available at 
http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/-Copeland%20Report%20CIRCULATED% 
20to%20Committees%20on%2010-21-13.pdf (“some elements of the definition of a ‘significant 
regulatory action’ are subject to interpretation, and OIRA may understandably view certain 
rules as meeting the definition that agencies do not.”). 
 56. William J. Clinton, U.S. President, Remarks on Signing the Executive Order on 
Regulatory Planning and Review and an Exchange With Reporters (Sept. 30, 1993), AMERICAN 
PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47134 (last visited Dec. 29, 
2014). 
 57. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and 
Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2013) [hereinafter Sunstein, Myths and Realities]; SUNSTEIN, 
SIMPLER supra note 8; Sunstein, Thirty-Six Questions, supra note 29; Cass R. Sunstein, On Not 
Revisiting Official Discount Rates: Institutional Inertia and the Social Cost of Carbon, 
(Regulatory Policy Program, Working Paper No. RPP-2013-21, 2013) [hereinafter Sunstein, 
Institutional Intertia].  In addition to the rules it is required to review, OIRA elects to review a 
number of rules that are not categorized as “economically significant” under Executive Order 
12,866. Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra, at 1869; see also Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. 
Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).  OIRA review is a process all major executive agency proposed 
rules must undergo at least twice before becoming regulations.  Stuart Shapiro, Unequal 
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window into the inner workings of OIRA that Professor Sunstein’s 
recent writings provide is valuable to OIRA watchers both inside and 
outside academia, because key portions of the review process are 
closed to any external would-be monitors.  For example, the crucial 
first centralized regulatory review of an inchoate rule—including any 
substantive revision to the proposed rule that occurs during this 
process—generally happens before the public has any opportunity to 
comment on (or even see) the agency’s original regulatory proposal.58  
And the public often has no idea whether a decision to hold up a rule 
came from an OIRA desk officer or the White House Chief of Staff—
the process is that impenetrable.59 
While Professor Sunstein has been writing about OIRA-
overseen centralized regulatory review and revision, additional 
windows into how this process functions under the Obama 
administration have appeared.  The first was a critique by Professor 
Lisa Heinzerling (former head of EPA’s Office of Policy and 
Planning), who provides a first-hand account of a deeply 
dysfunctional process, a narrative fundamentally at odds with 
Professor Sunstein’s apologetics.60  More recently, Curtis Copeland 
produced a report for the Administrative Conference of the United 
States that offered numerous accounts from anonymous sources 
inside the administration that—taken as a whole—also undermine 
Professor Sunstein’s narrative of a lightly flawed but basically well-
functioning regulatory review apparatus.61 
Centralized review in the Obama administration prioritizes the 
use of CBA in the regulatory decision-making process and has 
created increased pressure on agencies to follow A-4 requirements 
when assessing and reporting regulatory costs and benefits.62  
According to Professor Sunstein, the Obama administration’s focus 
 
Partners: Cost-Benefit Analysis and Executive Review of Regulations, 35 ENVT’L. L. REP.  10433, 
10435 (2005). 
 58. See COPELAND, supra note 55, at 15 (detailing the OIRA review process and 
demonstrating that OIRA review of proposed rules occurs before publication). 
 59. See id. at 17 (describing the process by which disputes between agencies and the OMB 
regarding the approval of a rule are resolved by the executive branch). 
 60. See generally Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the 
Relationship Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 
325 (2014) (discussing the relationship between the EPA and the White House, and the 
“chaotic” and self-interested nature of OIRA’s review process). 
 61. See generally COPELAND, supra note 55, at 40–49. 
 62. Cass R. Sunstein, The Stunning Triumph of Cost-Benefit Analysis, BLOOMBERGVIEW 
(Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2012-09-12/the-stunning-triumph-of-
cost-benefit-analysis. 
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on compliance with A-4 represents an “unprecedented commitment 
to quantification of both costs and benefits.”63 
This increased emphasis on compliance with A-4 in rulemaking 
and this policy focus on an especially rigid, formalistic CBA represent 
a giant move away from the intentions of E.O. 12,866.  Here, then-
Professor Elena Kagan describes the general intention of the Order: 
 
[E.O. 12,866] suggested a generally more positive attitude toward 
regulatory efforts, particularly on health and safety matters. In 
addition to reciting language about the potential benefits of 
regulation, the order eased the mandate that agencies use cost-
benefit analysis as the basis of decision-making by authorizing the 
agencies to incorporate in this analysis “equity,” “distributive 
impacts,” and “qualitative measures.”64 
 
A comparison of regulatory analyses under the Clinton and 
Obama administrations is illustrative of how far in the direction of 
formal, quantitative cost-benefit analysis regulatory review under 
E.O. 12,866 has drifted.  For example, in its 2000 rulemaking on 
health privacy standards, the Department of Health and Human 
Services declined to place a monetary figure on the intangible value 
of privacy, explaining that: 
 
Benefits [of the rule] are difficult to measure because people 
conceive of privacy primarily as a right, not as a commodity . . . .  
However, it is possible to evaluate some of the benefits that may 
accrue to individuals as a result of proposed regulation, and these 
benefits, alone, suggest that the regulation is warranted.  Added to 
these benefits is the intangible value of privacy, the security that 
individuals feel when personal information is kept confidential.  
This benefit is very real and very significant but there are no 
reliable means of measuring [the] dollar value of such benefit.65 
 
Yet when the Department of Justice recently issued regulations 
that were intended to control sexual abuse of prisoners, DOJ was 
required to submit a CBA of the proposal to OIRA, following the 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Kagan, supra note 48, at 2286. 
 65. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information Regulation 
Preamble, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, (proposed Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 CFR pts. 160 and 
164), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/final/PvcPre02.htm. 
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guidelines of A-4.66 In a chilling report, forcible rape of an adult 
prisoner was assigned a monetary value of -$310,000 or -$480,000, 
while “contacts with a staff member that only involved touching of 
the inmate’s buttocks, thigh, penis, breasts, or vagina in a sexual way” 
were assigned a value of -$600 per incident.67 
This willingness to monetize even rape represents a major shift 
from Clinton-era implementation of E.O. 12,866.  OIRA originally 
permitted the rulemaking agency to abstain from monetizing 
significantly lesser invasions of privacy and dignity, respecting the 
general understanding that some regulations protect rights that defy 
commodification. 
III. ALTHOUGH E.O. 12,866 IS INCOHERENT, ITS TEXT AND 
HISTORY ESTABLISH THAT REGULATORY ANALYSES WERE 
INTENDED TO ADDRESS DEONTOLOGICAL CONCERNS 
Textbooks on policy analysis tend to use the phrase “cost-benefit 
analysis” to refer very specifically to a formal economic analysis in 
which, among other things, the present value of social welfare gains 
and losses  are identified, quantified, and expressed in the same 
units.68  Historically, the analyses produced by agencies arguably have 
not been true “cost-benefit analyses” within the narrow, technical 
definition used in CBA textbooks, although they have indeed been 
analyses that considered costs and benefits and are generally referred 
to as “cost-benefit analyses.”69  Instead, these prior CBAs might 
include narrative descriptions of costs and benefits, with overt policy 
discussions finding their way into the CBA weighting along with the 
 
  66. Melissa J. Luttrell, Bentham at the OMB: A Response to Professor Rowell, 64 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 1013, 1029 (2012) [hereinafter Luttrell, Bentham]. 
  67. Id. (quoting Regulatory Impact Assessment: Notice Of Final Rule For Prison Rape 
Elimination Act (PREA) Standards at 24, 64 (May 17, 2012), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/programs/-pdfs/prea-ria.pdf).  For an excellent critique of this 
monetization see Daniel A. Farber, Breaking Bad? The Uneasy Case for Regulatory Breakeven 
Analysis 6–7 (Apr. 28, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 2430263. 
 68. See, e.g., JUST ET AL., supra note 17, at 170–71 (providing detailed explanations of 
different “money metrics” that may be used as proxies for utility); Amy Sinden, Formality and 
Informality in Cost-Benefit Analysis, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/-papers.cfm?abstract_id=2442357 at 7–14 (describing in detail the 
theoretical, welfare economics basics of this type of formal CBA). 
 69. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn, How Changes in the Federal Register Can Help Improve 
Regulatory Accountability, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 927, 932 (2000) (“The authors of the [EPA] 
report [did] not indicate if the agency was required to state specifically whether the benefits 
justified the costs, or if the authors simply drew their own conclusions.”). 
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monetary estimates.70 
Most of the CBAs produced under the Reagan and George H.W. 
Bush administrations under Executive Order 12,291, E.O. 12,866’s 
principal predecessor, in this way were quite different from the high-
theory CBAs described in public policy texts.  This practical result is 
inevitable, regardless of an administration’s attitude toward health, 
safety, and environmental regulation.  The insurmountable difficulties 
in quantification, monetization, and risk assessment prevent real 
world agency analyses from resembling formal, textbook models.71 
E.O. 12,866’s predecessor, E.O. 12,291, provided: “Regulatory 
action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society 
for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society[.]”72  E.O. 
12,866 was intended to soften the rigid CBA requirements of the 
Reagan-era E.O 12,291 by removing the absolute requirement that 
benefits outweigh costs to the extent permitted by law.73  As we have 
seen, even E.O. 12,291 was not so rigid in its adherence to “hard” 
CBA that the analyses it generated were limited to consideration of 
only quantified and monetized inputs. 
In its “regulatory philosophy” statement, E.O. 12,866 provides: 
 
In deciding whether and how to regulate, agencies should assess all 
costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives, including the 
alternative of not regulating.  Costs and benefits shall be 
understood to include both quantifiable measures (to the fullest 
extent that these can be usefully estimated) and qualitative 
measures of costs and benefits that are difficult to quantify, but 
nevertheless essential to consider. Further, in choosing among 
alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should select those 
approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential 
economic, environmental, public health and safety, and other 
advantages; distributive impacts; and equity), unless a statute 
requires another regulatory approach.74 
 
 
 70. See id. (“[Hahn] found that a large number (99%) of [regulatory impact] analyses 
reported cost information; most (87%) reported a quantification of benefits; only a few (25%) 
actually monetized those benefits; and even fewer (18%) reported that they found that 
monetized benefits exceeded costs.”). 
 71. Luttrell, Differential Discounting, supra note 38, at 118 n.117. 
 72. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981). 
 73. Luttrell, Bentham, supra note 66, at 1030; Sinden, supra note 68, at 73–74. 
 74. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (emphasis added). 
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The only way to read the language above as communicating 
anything intelligible is to read it as calling for a balancing of 
deontological ethical principles with the more welfarist/utilitarian 
values reflected—albeit incompletely—in a policy wherein all inputs 
to the analysis must be either monetized or omitted. 
There is no obvious way to import the required concern for 
“qualitative measures of costs and benefits that are difficult to 
quantify, but nevertheless essential to consider” into an analysis that 
monetizes “net benefits” without treating it as a type of quantitative 
data.  This complete quantification and monetization of all non-
economic values considered in the agency’s regulatory impact analysis 
is not only unnecessary, under the text of the executive order it is 
arguably forbidden. 
Agencies cannot literally maximize all the listed types of 
regulatory benefits, as “[i]t is not mathematically possible to 
maximize for two (or more) variables at the same time.”75  The 
techniques used in mathematics to maximize (or minimize) one 
variable or another necessarily imply that it is not possible to 
simultaneously maximize two variables in an equation.76 
 
A particularly striking expression of the popular misunderstanding 
about this pseudo-maximum problem is the famous statement 
according to which the purpose of social effort is the ‘greatest 
possible good for the greatest possible number.’  A guiding 
principle cannot be formulated by the requirement of maximizing 
two (or more) functions at once.  Such a principle, taken literally, is 
self-contradictory.  (In general one function will have no maximum 
where the other function has one.)  It is no better than saying, e.g., 
that a firm should obtain maximum prices at maximum turnover, or 
a maximum revenue at minimum outlay.77 
 
This directive to maximize and minimize multiple concerns 
occurs in E.O. 12,866 again, when “[t]o ensure that agencies’ 
regulatory programs are consistent with” the Order’s all-of-the-above 
 
 75. Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243 (1968). 
Concededly, simultaneous maximization of multiple variables could occur in theory if the 
variables in regulatory analysis were related in such a way that maximizing one also maximizes 
all.  Though in such a case, the equation need only maximize a single variable to maximize all of 
them, and the analyst should maximize that one variable. 
 76. Id. at 1243; JOHN VON NEUMANN AND OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THE THEORY OF 
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 11 (1944). 
 77. NEUMANN, supra note 76, at 11. 
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regulatory philosophy, the Order directs each agency to adhere to all 
of the following principles, among others:78 
 
 “design its regulations in the most cost-effective manner to 
achieve the regulatory objective.”79 
 “to the extent feasible, specify performance objectives, 
rather than specifying the behavior or manner of 
compliance that regulated entities must adopt.”80 
 “assess the effects of Federal regulations on State, local, 
and tribal governments, including specifically the 
availability of resources to carry out those mandates, and 
seek to minimize those burdens that uniquely or 
significantly affect such governmental entities, consistent 
with achieving regulatory objectives.”81 
 “tailor its regulations to impose the least burden on society, 
including individuals, businesses of differing sizes, and 
other entities (including small communities and 
governmental entities), consistent with obtaining the 
regulatory objectives . . .[.]”82 
 “draft its regulations to be simple and easy to understand, 
with the goal of minimizing the potential for uncertainty 
and litigation arising from such uncertainty.”83 
 “assess both the costs and the benefits of the intended 
regulation and, recognizing that some costs and benefits 
are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a regulation 
only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of 
the intended regulation justify its costs.”84 
 
As with the regulatory philosophy with which these principles 
are meant to ensure consistency, it is impossible for an agency to 
apply such competing directives in a literal way.  For example, the 
regulation that “imposes the least burden on society” might not 
 
 78. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
 79. Id. (emphasis added). 
 80. Id. (emphasis added). 
 81. Id. (emphasis added). 
 82. Id. (emphasis added). 
 83. Id. (emphasis added). 
 84. Id. 
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“minimiz[e] the potential for uncertainty and litigation arising from 
uncertainty,” and/or might not also “to the extent feasible, specify 
performance objectives[.]”85 
As with E.O. 12,866’s regulatory philosophy, the best reading 
would allow agencies to make “reasoned determinations” without 
monetizing intangible regulatory costs and benefits unless this 
monetization of intangibles makes sense.  It does not explicitly or 
implicitly call for across-the-board formal quantitative CBA, using 
the controversial techniques promoted at the time of A-4’s drafting 
by industry-sponsored think tanks like the Harvard Center for Risk 
Analysis (HCRA).86  Yet this is exactly what A-4 currently demands. 
IV. CIRCULAR A-4 IS NOT THE GOLD STANDARD FOR 
REGULATORY ANALYSIS 
A. Intentional and Unintentional Bias 
A significant function of OMB-supervised regulatory review has 
always been straightforwardly political.  It was thus under President 
Reagan, when the modern era of OIRA-overseen regulatory review 
began.87  This political gate-keeper/speed-check function has persisted 
through to the current administration.88  And so, during a recession 
year election when regulations were frequently characterized as “job-
killing,”89 the Obama administration was able to use OMB regulatory 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. The think tank former OIRA administrator John Graham directed immediately before 
his appointment to OIRA.  147 CONG. REC. S7906-04 (2001) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (listing 
corporate funders of Harvard Center for Risk Analysis (“HCRA”) and criticizing 
methodologies used to assess risk regulation as biased against protective regulation); id. 
(statement of Sen. Wellstone) (describing and criticizing  the under-protective methodologies 
employed at HCRA to assess risk regulation). 
 87. MILLER, supra note 39, at 2–4. 
 88. See COPELAND, supra note 55, at 4–5 (“From 1994 through 2011, the average amount 
of time it took to complete a review was 51 days . . . .  [I]n the first half of 2013, the average 
review time was 140 days . . . .”); John M. Broder, Groups Sue After E.P.A. Fails to Shift Ozone 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2011, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/science 
/earth/12epa.html?_r=0. (David Baron, a lawyer for Earthjustice environmental group, 
addressed the Obama administration’s rejection of a stricter ozone standard, stating that 
“instead of protecting people’s lungs as the law requires, [the Obama] administration based its 
decision on politics, leaving tens of thousands of Americans at risk of sickness and suffering.”). 
 89. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Bashing EPA Is New Theme in GOP Race, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
18, 2011, at A1 (“In an earlier debate [Michele Bachmann] said the agency should be renamed 
the  ‘job-killing organization of America.’  She has called global-warming science a hoax.”); 
Juliet Eilperin, EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Limits Affect Only New Power Plants, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 28, 2012, at A16 (“‘We were successful in stopping their job-killing agenda through 
legislation when we defeated cap-and-trade. Now our fight is to stop them from forcing it on the 
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review to keep controversial regulations on ice, at least until after the 
election.90  President Obama’s OIRA—as with the previous 
administration’s—will reportedly sometimes delay agencies’ 
submission of regulations to OIRA (or records them as having been 
“submitted” later than they really are)91 because official submission 
triggers a public notice.92 
While the purely political role of centralized regulatory review 
persists, there is much more than bald politics to centralized 
regulatory review.  Reviews at OIRA are overseen by OIRA staffers 
and administrators whose concerns surely include an earnest interest 
in good policy making, and who do not appear to believe they are 
manning the Death Star.93  The facially, though not actually,94 neutral 
checkpoint that all economically significant executive agency 
regulations must pass through, is careful review by OIRA for 
compliance with A-4.95  (EPA uses specialized guidelines for 
regulatory review, but these are meant to operationalize A-4’s 
requirements, not contradict or circumvent them.96)  
 
American people through regulations,’ said Sen. James M. Inhofe (Okla.), the top Republican 
on the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee.”). 
 90. COPELAND, supra note 55, at 4 (“[B]y the first half of 2013, at least 17 departments and 
agencies had average review times of more than 90 days (up from only two departments in 
2011) . . . .  [Agency employees explained this was due to] concerns by some in the Executive 
Office of the President (EOP) about the issuance of potentially costly or otherwise controversial 
rules during an election year[.]”). 
 91. Id. at 40–41 (“For example, the agency’s ‘NPDES Electronic Reporting Rule’ (2020-
AA47) was sent to OIRA on December 22, 2011, but was not ‘received’ by OIRA until nearly a 
month later, on January 20, 2012”); see also Heinzerling, supra note 60, at 360 (noting the same 
month-long time gap in the NPDES Electronic Reporting Rule). 
 92. See COPELAND, supra note 55, at 32 (explaining that OIRA administrator Howard 
Shelanski in 2013 said that “unnecessary delays in review are harmful to everyone: to those who 
are denied the benefits of regulation, to those wishing to comment on proposed rules and 
influence policy, and to those who must plan for any changes the regulations require of them”). 
 93. Id. at 41–42; John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and 
Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 400 (2008) [hereinafter Graham, Saving Lives]. 
 94. See Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, supra note 37, at 387 n.290 (citing 
William W. Buzbee, Regulatory Reform or Statutory Muddle: The “Legislative Mirage” of Single 
Statute Regulatory Reform, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 298, 369–71 (1996) (explaining that CBA relies 
on non-transparent political judgments)); Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting 
the Cost of Health, Safety and Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 2018 (2002) 
(“[M]any of these broad [CBA] assessments are based largely upon ex ante predictions, highly 
ambitious assumptions, and very little empirical analysis of the actual costs that regulatees have 
incurred in complying with particular regulations.”). 
 95. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, supra note 39, at 15 (“Indeed, regulatory agencies are 
not beyond hiding policy judgments behind the “scientific” veneer of risk assessment.”). 
 96. U.S. EPA, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES 1-1 to 1-2 (2010), 
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1. Formality vs. Informality 
Over time, the A-4 methodologies have come to be regarded as 
the “gold standard” of applied regulatory analysis.97  This Section 
describes some of the controversial—and flat-out incorrect—
methodologies required by A-4.  Because of these mistakes, even an 
earnest attempt to apply A-4 methodologies to obtain an unbiased 
result must necessarily fail. 
First, the small piece of E.O. 12,866 that A-4 actually addresses, 
directs agencies to assess prospective costs and benefits.  It is not at 
all clear that this therefore calls for a formal, quantitative cost-benefit 
analysis of the sort required by A-4.  Again, an evaluation of costs 
and benefits can be a simple weighing of pros and cons, or a highly 
elaborate welfare analysis that occupies several PhDs for several 
months, and which follows years, or even decades, of data collection. 
A-4 was drafted by OIRA Administrator John Graham and his 
staff98 at a time when numerous prominent scholars contended that 
OIRA promoted a formalistic CBA, which generated irrational 
results that perverted the very laws being implemented through 
regulation.99  Professors Matthew Adler and Eric Posner aptly 
described CBA’s reputation among academics across disciplines near 
the time A-4 was drafted: 
 
The reputation of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) among American 
academics has never been as poor as it is today, while its popularity 
among agencies in the United States government has never been 
greater.  Many law professors, economists, and philosophers 
believe that CBA does not produce morally relevant information 
and should not be used in project evaluation.  A few commentators 
argue that the information produced by CBA has some, but 
limited, relevance. Defenders of CBA form an increasingly 
beleaguered minority, consisting mostly of applied economists who 
feel compelled to respond to attacks on the methodological 
underpinnings of their work.  Modern textbooks on CBA are 




 97. Videotape: Administrative Conference of the United States: Committee on Regulation, 
supra note 40, at 1:40:33. 
 98. John D. Graham et al., Managing the Regulatory State: The Experience of the Bush 
Administration, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953, 966–69 (2006). 
 99. E.g., Mathew D. Adler & Eric A Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE 
L.J. 167, 167 (1999). 
15_Luttrell_PublishedVersion (Do Not Delete) 1/15/2015  6:05 PM 
156 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXV:131 
 
the procedure, but most of them frankly acknowledge its serious 
flaws and the inadequacy of the standard methods for correcting 
these flaws.100 
 
Nevertheless, A-4 enthusiastically embraces the methodologies 
of this “beleaguered minority” of applied economists.  A4 requires 
that monetization and quantification are to be attempted whenever 
possible.101  A4 demands discounting at a very high rate, higher even 
than what most economists in the field advocate.102  The document 
also places a very high value on data collection—a policy that has 
generally operated to prevent timely responses to known serious risks 
because the status quo persists while the agency waits for data.103 
There were other, less rigid and formalistic, and—in the views of 
many—better ways to compare pros and cons under E.O. 12,866.  The 
Order merely exhorts agencies to ensure costs “justify” benefits, 
which could have been interpreted to require an evaluation of 
alternatives including narrative descriptions of regulatory impacts, 
and eschewing the controversial practice of discounting human and 
environmental benefits.104  As Professor Amy Sinden explains in an 
excellent forthcoming article: 
 
Informal CBA relies on qualitative descriptions intuitively 
compared and purports to give no more than general guidance.  
The most formal varieties of CBA, on the other hand, rely on 
numbers and mathematics and purport, at least, to provide precise 
answers.  Informal CBA provides no more than a secondary check 
 
 100. Id. at 167.  In the article, however, Professors Adler and Posner offer a qualified 
defense of CBA. 
 101. OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23. 
 102. See infra note 114 and accompanying text; see also McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 
supra note 39, at 71–72 (“A high discount rate biases the analysis against future benefits, even 
though ‘it is not clear why the later born should have to pay interest to induce their predecessors 
not to exhaust [depletable resources].’” (quoting Michael S. Baram, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An 
Inadequate Basis for Health, Safety and Environmental Regulatory Decisionmaking, 9 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 473, 488–89 (1980))). 
 103. See generally McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, supra note 39, at 26 (“The exceedingly 
detailed risk assessments . . . have a huge potential to consume scarce agency resources and 
delay rulemaking initiatives.  The fact that much of the necessary information is within the 
control of the regulated industry, which has every incentive to delay new regulations, only 
exacerbates the potential for delay.”). 
 104. For an excellent description of how this approach might be implemented, see Sidney A. 
Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic Reorientation, 
32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 433, 469–83 (2008). 
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on a decision that has been made by other means, while formal 
CBA provides a standard-setting tool for identifying the optimal 
choice from among a whole range of regulatory alternatives.  And 
between these two extremes lie yet more varieties of CBA.105 
 
The language in E. O. 12,866 that A-4 implements does not 
require the type of formal, quantitative CBA that relies heavily on 
expensive and elaborate risk assessment protocols and controversial 
monetization procedures to produce numerical “net benefit” 
estimates.  A-4 is far at the formal end of the CBA spectrum.  It 
instructs agencies to use a set of estimation procedures that, although 
deeply entrenched after decades of use at OIRA, reflect neither good 
economics nor good sense.106 
2. Why A-4 Methodologies Generate “Garbage Out” Results, Even 
Given Accurate Inputs 
Perhaps the strongest basis for inferring that A-4 reflects more 
than pure, apolitical policy judgment, unfettered by other pressures, is 
the specified discount rate.  A-4 specifies that even for expenditures 
during a recession, a range of values that includes an after-inflation 
discount rate of 7% should be assessed and reported. This is 
unjustifiable even under the A-4 logic, which reports that this rate 
represents the “opportunity cost of capital.”107 
This opportunity cost theory assumes that, in the absence of 
regulation, the inflation-adjusted annual growth in value of the 
avoided costs would be 7%.  But it is wildly implausible to assume 
avoided regulatory costs would experience growth at this rate.  For 
example, if 7% is a firm’s return on investment after adjusting for 
inflation, then achieving 7% annual growth in the value of all avoided 
regulatory compliance costs would require 100% reinvestment of 
these funds by the firm during the lifespan of the proposed regulation, 
with zero consumption.  Moreover: 
 
[F]or regulations for which the costs, invested at the discount rate, 
would not grow enough to exceed the expected benefits by the time 
the benefits are to be realized (that is, for any regulation that passes 
CBA under equal discounting), the problem is compounded.  If all 
 
 105. Sinden, supra note 68, at 2–3. 
 106. See supra notes 98–106 and accompanying text; see infra notes 108–114 and 
accompanying text. 
 107. OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 34. 
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the foregone costs are unlikely to be invested, it is still less likely 
that a larger sum of money—i.e., the amount that would have to be 
invested at the discount rate in order for the value of the 
investment to equal the value of the regulatory benefits at the times 
they would have occurred—would be invested as a direct result of a 
regulator’s decision not to regulate.108 
 
Many prominent economists and philosophers have persuasively 
argued that human lives and other intangible goods should not be 
discounted at all, since “harms to future generations deserve no less 
protection than harms to the current generation.”109  But among 
academics who endorse formal, quantitative CBA with discounting, 
the vast majority recommend a rate approaching the “social rate of 
time preference,” which has been estimated to be a real (that is, after-
inflation) rate of between one and three percent.110  Additionally, 
economists generally recommend substantially lower rates for 
protections meant to benefit future generations, as in the climate 
change context.111  There is simply no sound economic or ethical basis 
for requiring agencies to use the 7% rate in regulatory analyses.112 
The 7% discount rate greatly undervalues all benefits that are 
expected to accrue in the future, and thus seriously distorts evaluation 
of the benefits of public protection.  This requirement to report 
benefits under an unreasonably high discount rate is—and always has 
been—a normative choice, one masquerading as objective economics.  
It is also a choice that does not reflect the United States’ expressed 
preferences, as a nation that cares about children’s welfare 
(evidenced by the protective agendas of major public health and 
environmental statutes that agencies are charged with 
implementing).113 
When John Graham began his tenure at OIRA, he had already 
 
 108. Luttrell, Differential Discounting, supra note 38, at 112 (emphasis added). 
 109. Edward R. Morrision, Judicial Review of Discount Rates Used in Regulatory Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1333, 1338–39 (1998); see also Lisa Heinzerling, 
Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 2025, 2025–29 (1999); McGarity, supra 
note 39, at 71–72; Richard L. Revesz & Matthew R. Shahabian, Climate Change and Future 
Generations, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1097, 1104–06 (2011). 
 110. JUST ET AL., supra note 17, at 580. 
 111. Martin L. Weitzman, Gamma Discounting, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 260, 267–68 (2001). 
 112. See Revesz & Shahabian, supra note 109, at 1110–15 (discussing economic basis for 
decreasing discount rates in future). 
 113. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7545(b)(4)(A)(i) (2012) (requiring administrator to conduct study 
on the effects that the increased use of certain chemicals in gasoline have on public health). 
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acknowledged a real discount rate of 7% was too high for evaluating 
public health and safety regulations.114  The prevailing view among 
academic experts was also that 7% was significantly too high for 
evaluating health, safety, and environmental regulations.115  Yet he 
claimed one of his major achievements as OIRA Administrator was 
the change in required methodology that specified the discount rate 
to be used for regulatory review would be both 7% and 3%.116  One 
wonders what—given the other major changes Graham made to the 
status quo—kept Graham from eliminating the 7% rate altogether, 
given that he believed the rate was too high and that the 3% real rate 
was better.117 
Similarly, prior to becoming OIRA Administrator, Professor 
Cass Sunstein was on record criticizing A-4’s call for both a 7% real 
rate and a 3% real rate, since the 7% rate seemed “badly outmoded” 
to Sunstein in 2007.118  Yet, during his three years as head of OIRA, 
agencies were required to prepare analyses under both rates.  
Although the 7% rate enjoys little support among experts, it 
nevertheless plays a very influential role since it is politically difficult 
for agencies to produce regulations that have “net costs” under either 
rate.  It is puzzling that it has never been eliminated, especially during 
a sustained recession, when even the opportunity cost arguments that 
once supported the 7% rate among a minority of economists were 
unavailable. 
Other examples of anti-regulation biases that have persisted 
through each version of OMB’s methodological guidelines on CBA 
include the manner in which regulatory costs and benefits are 
quantified and monetized.119  As applied, these requirements have 
 
 114. E.g., Tammy O. Tengs & John D. Graham, The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social 
Investments in Life-Saving, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS 
FROM REGULATION 167, 169 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996) (employing as well as advocating use 
of a five percent discount rate); see also Graham, Saving Lives, supra note 93, at 504 (writing 
less than two years after stepping down as OIRA Administrator that “many past [CBAs] have 
used discount rates (e.g., 7% or 10% per year) for future health benefits that we now realize are 
too high.”). 
 115. Graham, Saving Lives, supra note 93, at 504 n.471. 
 116. Id., at 504; see also OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 33–34. 
 117. See id. at 504 (describing 7% rate as “too high” and describing a methodological change 
that gave “stronger consideration” to the 3% rate as an improvement to the regulatory review 
process, even though agencies were still requested to use both rates in their analyses). 
 118. Cass R. Sunstein & Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money, 
and Intergenerational Equity, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 171, 206 n.126 (2007). 
 119. See Luttrell, Differential Discounting, supra note 38, at 82–83 n.9 (collecting OMB 
guidance documents implementing the cost-benefit analysis requirements of Executive Order 
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systematically undervalued regulatory benefits, which tend to be 
more difficult than costs to quantify and monetize, while the process 
for estimating costs often produces inflated numbers.120  In addition, 
even when implementing protective statutory language, agencies are 
directed not to be conservative in their assumptions regarding risks to 
public health and the environment, but instead to use less protective 
“best estimates” of risk.121  This is another practice that, as a practical 
matter, reduces flexibility in standard setting and likely causes 
agencies systematically to underestimate the need for regulatory 
protections.  This “best estimate” language does not exist in E.O. 
12,866, though the Order does contain flexible language allowing 
agencies to use the “best reasonably obtainable information 
concerning the need for, and consequences of, the intended 
regulation.”122  A-4’s default rule managing risk regulation requires 
that agencies give preference to less protective, central estimates of 
risk, thereby possibly delaying time-sensitive regulation until the 
“best available” information is obtained.  A-4’s default rule 
undermines E.O. 12,866’s more flexible “reasonably obtainable” 
language. 
B. Peer Review and Public Comment 
A-4 supporters, including OIRA administrators under 
Republican and Democratic administrations, endorse it as the 
 
12291, and its successor, Executive Order 12,866). 
 120. LISA HEINZERLING, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION, COMMENTS FROM THE 
CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION ON DRAFT OMB REPORT AND COST-BENEFIT 
GUIDELINES (Apr. 3, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/ 
assets/omb/inforeg/2003 report/251.pdf. 
 121.  OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 42.  A-4 provides: 
 
It is a common practice to compare the “best estimates” of both benefits and costs 
with those of competing alternatives.  These “best estimates” are usually the 
average or the expected value of benefits and costs.  Emphasis on these expected 
values is appropriate as long as society is “risk neutral” with respect to the 
regulatory alternatives.  While this may not always be the case, you should in 
general assume “risk neutrality” in your analysis. 
 
Id.  For a discussion of why conservative assumptions in risk assessments lead to more stringent 
standards, see McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, supra note 39, at 27–29.  For a recent discussion 
of how a more precautionary stance might be imported into CBA, and why “to the extent that 
CBA does not adequately address catastrophic risk, it egregiously violates the precautionary 
principle,” see David M. Driesen, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Precautionary Principle: Can 
They Be Reconciled?, 43 MICH. ST. L. REV. 771, 806 (2013). 
 122. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
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product of peer review and a public notice-and-comment process.123  
They also claim it reflects mainstream economic consensus.124  
However, A-4 was developed by OMB through a flawed process, so it 
is unsurprising that the final document retained the serious 
substantive biases described above. 
One of the goals of peer review is to ensure quality; for example, 
academic peer reviewers are expected to identify flaws and suggest 
improvements.125  For this to occur, the selection of peer reviewers is 
determinative.  Diverse viewpoints are necessary to avoid review by 
an echo chamber of extremely like-minded “peers.” 
All seven of A-4’s peer reviewers were economists or law 
professors who endorsed the controversial applied welfare economics 
approach to regulatory review.126  This means that implementing the 
relevant language in the Executive Order excluded many viewpoints 
 
 123. See, e.g., Rulemaking Process and the Unitary Executive Theory Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, 110th Cong. 6–7 (2008) (testimony of 
Susan E. Dudley, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs). 
 124. Graham, Saving Lives, supra note 93, at 452 n.259 (“Both OMB Circular A-4 and the 
OMB’s annual report to Congress on the costs and benefits of federal regulations are produced 
through a process that includes peer review by leading scholars in the fields of BCA and 
administrative law, as well as public comment.”); see also Sunstein, Thirty-Six Questions, supra 
note 29, at 172–73 (“[i]t is noteworthy that Circular A-4 was issued in the George W. Bush 
Administration and continues in the Obama Administration; its longevity attests to its technical 
character”). 
 125. Reviewing Peer Review, 4 NATURE IMMUNOLOGY 297 (2003), available at http://www. 
nature.com/ni/journal/v4/n4/full/ni0403-297.html. 
 126. The peer reviewers of A-4 were Cass Sunstein, Lester Lave, Milton C. Weinstein, 
James K. Hammitt, Kerry Smith, Jonathan Weiner, Douglas K. Owens, and W. Kip Viscusi. 
OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 1.  The followings works, all of which were published 
before the requests to peer review A-4, are examples of scholarship, authored by the peer 
reviewers, all of which endorses or employs CBA (and/or its close cousin, cost-effectiveness 
analysis) as a decision tool in policymaking: RISK VS. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING 
HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1997); 
James K. Hammitt & John D. Graham, Willingness to Pay for Health Protection: Inadequate 
Sensitivity to Probability?, 18 J. OF RISK & UNCERTAINTY 33 (1999); Lester B. Lave & Satish V. 
Joshi, Benefit Cost Analysis in Public Health, 17 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 203 (1996); V. Kerry 
Smith & Ju-Chin Huang, Can Markets Value Air Quality? A Meta-Analysis of Hedonic Property 
Value Models, 103 J. OF POL. ECON. 209 (1995); CASS SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, 
LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2002); Milton Weinstein et al., Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of 
AIDS Prevention Programs: Concepts, Complications, and Illustrations, in AIDS: SEXUAL 
BEHAVIOR AND INTRAVENOUS DRUG USE 471 (C.F. Turner et al. eds., 1989); W. Kip Viscusi 
& Joni Hersch, Cigarette Smokers as Job Risk Takers, 83 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 203, 269–80 
(2001). 
This set of academics was highly biased toward those who promoted more formal, 
quantitative welfare analyses than what would have been strictly necessary to satisfy Executive 
Order 12,866’s direction that costs be evaluated to determine whether they “justify” benefits.  
There is no dispute that any of the above-listed peer reviewers are excellent scholars. 
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opposed to this use of formal, quantitative CBA, which, at the time, 
was endorsed by only a “beleaguered minority” of academics.127 
Critics of using formal, quantitative CBA to assist in making 
regulatory decisions would not have been difficult to locate; these 
scholars were publishing numerous law review articles and testifying 
on Capitol Hill against efforts to expand CBA’s influence even 
further.  For example, Professors Sidney Shapiro and Thomas 
McGarity, legal scholars who were among the many academics who 
published and testified before Congress on CBA methodological 
issues during this time period, held endowed chairs at the University 
of Kansas and the University of Texas, respectively.128 
The draft guidelines were emailed to prospective peer reviewers 
by then Administrator of OIRA, Professor John Graham.  Most of 
these peer reviewers were either his recent co-authors, fellow 
affiliates of AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, 
former close collaborators, or recent colleagues at HCRA (a think 
tank he directed immediately before taking over as OIRA 
administrator). 
Furthermore, the phrase “peer reviewed” was used here with a 
much different meaning than it has in academia, and the process used 
was inadequate to ensure quality control.  No obligation existed for 
Circular A-4 to satisfy independent peer reviewers or, as in academia, 
an impartial editor.  Instead, its authors could take what suggestions 
they liked and ignore the rest. 
The draft guidelines that were emailed129 to prospective peer 
reviewers by Professor Graham reflect many of his policy priorities 
while at HCRA.130  Two of the peer reviewers had worked with 
 
 127. Adler & Posner, supra note 99, at 167. 
 128. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Curriculum Vitae, available at http://law.wfu.edu/faculty/assets/ 
profile/cv/cv.shapirsa.pdf; Thomas O. McGarity, Curriculum Vitae, available at 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/cvs/tom56_cv.pdf; Public Health and Natural Resources: A 
Review of the Implementation of our Environmental Laws—Parts I and II Hearings Before the 
Committee on Gov. Affairs, 107th Cong. 42–46 (March 7, 2002) (testimony of Thomas O. 
McGarity, W. J. Kronzer Chair, University of Texas Law School). 
 129. See, e.g., E-mail exchange between John Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory 
Affairs, Office of Mgmt. & Budget and Kerry Smith, Faculty Emeritus, Dep’t of Econ., N.C. 
State Univ. (Feb. 9, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb 
/assets/omb/inforeg/2003report/5.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2014). 
 130. Compare OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, with Clean Air Act: Review and 
Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcommittee On Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property, and 
Nuclear Safety, Committee on Environment and Public Works, 106th Cong. 85–90 (1999) 
(statement of John D. Graham, Director, Center for Risk Analysis, Harvard School of Public 
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Professor Graham at HCRA prior to Graham’s appointment as 
OIRA administrator;131 these two reviewers should have been 
excluded due to conflicts of interest.  The common-sense guideline 
that excludes former “close collaborators”132 from the set of eligible 
peer reviewers would have excluded these two former colleagues, 
who had co-authored numerous articles with him, in addition to a 
third scholar who co-authored a book with Professor Graham and a 
fourth who authored its foreword.133  Thus, four of the seven 
reviewers had real or apparent conflicts of interest that should have 
excluded them from A-4’s peer reviewers. 
The remaining three peer reviewers and Professor Graham were 
among the academics who signed an amicus brief sponsored by the 
AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies and filed in 
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations.134  The brief was filed 
less than a year before Professor Graham’s nomination.135  The brief 
 
Health). 
 131. According to the October 1996 issue of Risk in Perspective, a publication of The 
Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, Milton Weinstein “founded” HCRA in 1995.  See Milton C. 
Weinstein, Panel Issues Standards for Cost Effective Analysis, 4 RISK IN PERSPECTIVE 6 (Oct. 
1996), available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/1273/2013/06/Panel-
Issues-Standards-Oct-96.pdf; but see John D. Graham, School of Pub. & Envtl. Affairs, Ind. 
Univ., Curriculum Vitae at 2, available at www.indiana.edu/~spea/. . ./vita/ graham_john_cv.pdf\ 
(Professor Graham’s CV lists his position as “founding director” of HCRA from 1989 to 2001). 
While this timeline is somewhat confusing, it seems safe to infer they worked together at HCRA 
at the same time.  Professor Graham was also described as the Director of HCRA at the same 
time A-4 peer reviewer and current HCRA Director James Hammitt was on the faculty at 
HCRA.  See Edmond Toy, John D. Graham & James K Hammit, Fueling Heavy Duty Trucks: 
Diesel or Natural Gas, 8 RISK IN PERSPECTIVE 1 (Jan. 2000), available at http://www.hsph. 
harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/1273/2013/06/RISK_IN_PERSP_JANUARY2000.pdf 
(Hammit and Graham co-authored this article for the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis.). 
 132. RULES AND REGULATIONS ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 
58 Fed. Reg. 45,409-01 (Aug. 30, 1993). 
 133. SUNSTEIN, RISK V. RISK, supra note 126, at vii–xii. 
 134. Brief Amici Curiae of AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies et al. 
supporting Cross-Petitioners at 13–18, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (No. 99-
426) (2001), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2000/7/ 
naaqs%20litan/07_naaqs_litan.pdf.  Notably, Professors Graham, Sunstein, and Viscusi held 
contemporaneous positions on the Council of Academic Advisers for the AEI-Brookings Joint 
Center for Regulatory Studies.  Id. at iii. 
 135. Id. at i; see also U.S. Senate Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 
Nominations Hearing: John D. Graham to be Administrator of the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs at the Office of Management and Budget, Angela Styles to be Administrator of 
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and Steven A. Perry to be Administrator of the General 
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contended that CBA “can help promote the design of better 
regulations by providing a sensible framework for comparing the 
alternatives involved in any regulatory choice,” and supported 
considering cost in determining ambient air quality standards.136 
This surely does not amount to “recent co-authorship” such that 
any of these peer reviewers would be disqualified from peer 
reviewing Professor Graham’s work in a well-regarded journal for 
this reason alone.137  However, it is significant that even these three 
peer reviewers—possibly the only peer reviewers of A-4 who would 
not have been disqualified due to conflict of interest concerns from 
peer reviewing a scholarly publication by Professor Graham—had 
demonstrated themselves to be politically active in advocating for an 
even greater role for CBA in rulemaking, just like Professor Graham. 
At the time A-4 was circulated as a draft, prospective peer 
reviewers existed who would likely have proposed other operational 
guidelines for the agencies.  For example, guidelines that relied more 
on reasoned judgment than on the quasi-scientific formulae promoted 
by the beleaguered champions of a regulatory decision-making 
scheme driven by fully monetized CBA and by CBA’s close relative, 
cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA).138  The numerous skeptics of this 
HCRA-style CBA and CEA who were writing at the time might have 
proposed ways to present regulatory impacts that depended less on 
monetization and would better balance consequentialist and 
deontological concerns.139  Some of these potential peer reviewers 
even commented on A-4 when it was presented as a draft.140 
In addition, while public comments were solicited, there was no 
 
perry-to-be-administrator-of-the-general-services-administration (nominating Graham to be 
Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in 2001). 
 136. See id. 
 137. SARA ROCKWELL, YALE UNIV. OFFICE OF RESEARCH INTEGRITY, ETHICS OF PEER 
REVIEW: A GUIDE FOR MANUSCRIPT REVIEWERS 7, available at 
http://radonc.yale.edu/Images/Ethical_Issues_in_Peer_ Review_tcm307-34211.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 28, 2014) (“In general, you should not review papers written by people you have 
collaborated with or published with in the recent past.”). 
 138. These two forms of welfare analyses are closely related and rely on many of the same 
tools, such as discounting.  CEA produces ratios showing how programs aimed at achieving the 
same goal compare; in cost-effectiveness analysis (unlike CBA), either the costs or the benefits 
are fixed, and results are expressed as, for example, lives (or acres of wilderness) saved per 
dollar.  See OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 9–12. 
 139. Examples of such scholars include Lisa Heinzerling, Sidney Shapiro, and Thomas 
McGarity, among many others. 
 140. E.g., Heinzerling, supra note 120. 
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“notice and comment” in the sense in which that term is used for 
rulemakings under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).  A 
crucial difference is that in APA rulemakings the rulemaking agency 
must provide a reasonable, non-arbitrary response to commenters or 
face possible legal consequences for moving forward in the face of 
commenter criticism.  Here, OMB was able to unilaterally decide 
when it had adequately addressed commenters’ concerns, with 
commenters from the affected public having no recourse analogous to 
the affected public’s standing to sue under the APA.  Thus, to say the 
OMB guidelines were subject to “public notice and comment”141 is 
misleading, since the phrase evokes notice-and-comment procedures 
under the APA, which have teeth.  
V. THE UNCOMFORTABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A-4 AND THE 
SOCIAL COST OF CARBON 
In addition to the harm A-4 creates directly by pushing 
regulations toward less stringency for irrational reasons, A-4 has also 
provided grounds for legislators,142 academics,143 interest groups,144 and 
think tank analysts145 to criticize the administration’s estimated social 
cost of carbon (SCC) (the monetized value of a marginal metric ton 
of carbon pollution avoided).  The administration’s estimated SCC 
also reflects the avoidance of an equivalent metric ton of carbon in 
the form of another GHG.  Critics of EPA’s proposed existing power 
plant rule and other rules that incorporate the SCC into their CBAs 
have used A-4 as the basis for opposing these regulations, arguing 
that the SCC fails to “follow the rules.”  Following the rules here 
 
 141. Administrative Conference of the United States: Committee on Regulation, supra note 
40, at 1:40:23; Graham, Valuing the Future, supra note 41, at 51; Sunstein, Thirty-Six Questions, 
supra note 29, at 201. 
 142. Supra notes 23, 26–27 and accompanying text. 
 143. GAYER & VISCUSI, supra note 19, at 8. 
 144. Robert P. Murphy, Power Plant Rule Fails Administration’s Own Cost/Benefit Test, 
INST. FOR ENERGY RESEARCH (June 2, 2014), http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/ 
power-plant-rule-fails-administrations-costbenefit-test/#; U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INST. 
FOR 21ST CENTURY ENERGY,  ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF POTENTIAL NEW CARBON DIOXIDE 
REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (2014), available at http://www.energyxxi.org/sites/ 
default/files/file-tool/Assessing_the_Impact_of_Potential_New_Carbon_Regulations_in_the_ 
United_States.pdf. 
 145. PATRICK J. MICHAELS & PAUL C. KNAPPENBERGER, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF 
SCIENCE, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET’S REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON THE 
TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT ENTITLED TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF 
CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 2 (Feb. 26, 
2014), available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/omb_scc_comments_ 
michaels_knappenberger.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2014); Murphy, supra note 144. 
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means complying with A-4 methodological provisions that are wrong.  
For example, legislation was introduced in the House that would 
require EPA to produce additional analyses of emissions limits on 
power plants using “best available methods,” defined as analyses 
“consistent with guidance from . . . Circular A-4.”146 
Interestingly, the divergence from OMB methodologies does 
more than just inflate the SCC.  For example, by valuing foreign lives 
in developing nations at a lower value than U.S. lives, the SCC 
estimates are lower than they would be if they employed the 
estimated value of a life saved (or lost) within the range OMB 
endorses.  Valuing all lives at the same rate used to value American 
lives in the same CBAs would have greatly increased the value of 
reducing GHG emissions within the United States. 
A. Background on the Social Cost of Carbon 
The costs and benefits of regulations promulgated under 
President Obama’s Climate Action Plan are being assessed using 
valuations of climate harms that were generated by an Inter-Agency 
Working Group (IWG) convened for this purpose.147  In 2013, the 
IWG’s initial 2010 figures were updated to reflect updates in its 
underlying models; these 2013 updates significantly increased the 
SCC figures.148 
The impetus for the IWG’s initial SCC estimates was a decision 
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
forbidding agencies from ignoring the costs and benefits of 
monetizable climate harms when using CBA to set standards.149  That 
case arose in 2006 when the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) used the monetizable social cost and 
 
 146. H.R. 2948, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 147. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL COSTS OF CARBON, TECHNICAL 
SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 
UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/oms/climate/ 
regulations/scc-tsd.pdf [hereinafter 2010 TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SCC]; The Social 
Cost of Carbon, U.S. EPA (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPA 
activities/economics/scc.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2014). 
 148. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL COSTS OF CARBON, TECHNICAL 
SUPPORT DOCUMENT: TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR 
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 2 (Nov. 2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/inforeg/technical-update-social-cost-of-
carbon-for-regulator-impact-analysis.pdf [hereinafter 2013 TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SCC]. 
 149. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 508 F.3d 508, 558 
(9th Cir. 2007), vacated and reh’g denied, 538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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benefit inputs in its CBA to identify the fuel economy standard that 
was the most cost-beneficial.150  After considering incorporation of a 
monetized value for carbon dioxide emissions in its 2003 proposed 
rule, the agency ultimately declined to monetize carbon dioxide when 
setting the 2006 final rule, which meant that the value of avoiding 
carbon dioxide emissions was not considered when NHTSA set its 
standard.151  The following year, the Ninth Circuit found the agency’s 
failure to factor in the value of carbon dioxide emissions to be 
arbitrary and capricious, explaining that while various experts’ 
monetary estimations left the agency with a range of estimates for the 
value of carbon dioxide—many of them centering on approximately 
$50 per metric ton of carbon dioxide, with others ranging as low as 
$3—the monetizable value of this benefit was surely not $0.152 
The purpose of the SCC estimates is to allow agencies to 
incorporate the social benefits of reducing GHG emissions into 
CBAs.  Like A-4, it is intended to direct agencies in implementing the 
CBA requirements of E.O. 12,866.  According to the IWG, “the SCC 
is an estimate of the monetized damages associated with an 
incremental increase in carbon emissions in a given year.”153  It is 
intended to value changes in agricultural productivity, human health 
impacts, property damage, and environmental impacts from climate 
change.154 
The IWG’s 2013 increases to SCC estimates were initially rolled 
out quietly in an energy conservation rule for microwave ovens.155  
These increases generated a great deal of controversy, with the House 
of Representatives even passing legislation that would prohibit 
 
 150. Id. at 523–27. 
 151. Id.; Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks Model Years 2008-2011, 71 
Fed. Reg. 17,566, 17,589 (Apr. 6, 2006) (“On the benefit side, for example, there is a significant 
reduction in carbon dioxide emissions, which cannot be monetized.  There is no agreement in 
the literature on values or range of values for monetizing such a benefit to the United States.”). 
 152. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 508 F.3d at 533; see also Masur & Posner, supra note 21, at 
1557–63 (summarizing agencies’ decisions to begin including value for Social Cost of Carbon 
(SCC) in their regulator CBAs on an ad hoc basis). 
 153. 2013 TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SCC, supra note 148, at 2. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Standby Mode and 
Off Mode for Microwave Ovens, 78 Fed. Reg. 36,316, 36,349–52 (Jun. 17, 2013) (amended 10 
C.F.R. pts. 429, 430); see also New Energy Efficiency Standards for Microwave Ovens to Save 
Consumers on Energy Bills, ENERGY.GOV (May 31, 2013), http://energy.gov/articles/new-
energy-efficiency-standards-microwave-ovens-save-consumers-energy-bills (last visited Nov. 4, 
2014). 
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agencies from using the SCC in certain large energy rules.156  In a 
Senate hearing shortly after the updates to the SCC were announced, 
newly appointed OIRA Administrator Howard Shelanski faced 
criticism for OIRA’s failure to circulate the update for public 
comment, and was questioned on the failure to follow A-4’s 
methodology.157  In response to this uproar, OMB opened the 2013 
SCC update to public comment.158  So far, it has not officially 
responded to comments. 
Congressional opposition to the SCC has continued.  Senator 
Vitter and 31 co-sponsors introducing a resolution condemning 
EPA’s CBAs of its proposed and final rules setting limits on new and 
existing power plant GHG emissions.159  The proposed resolution 
condemns EPA for, among other things, “fail[ing] to provide a 
complete assessment of the economic costs imposed by the proposed 
rules or the benefits that may result.”160 
B. A-4 Is an Internal Management Document Created by Executive 
Fiat Under the George W. Bush Administration, and the Obama 
Administration Can Freely Ignore It 
For all the reasons described above, A-4 is not the right way for 
regulators to evaluate regulations under E.O. 12,866.  And it is 
certainly the wrong tool for evaluating climate change policy: A-4 
openly acknowledges its requirements do a poor job of valuing 
intergenerational benefits.161  Fortunately, IWG was not required to 
use A4 analysis to arrive at the SCC. 
Yet legislators, policymakers, scholars, and think tank analysts 
have repeatedly criticized the IWG’s recommendations for failing to 
comply with some of A-4’s requirements in deriving the SCC.162  The 
substance of the claims that the particular methodologies in dispute 
 
 156. H.R. 1582, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 157. Examining the Obama Administration’s Social Cost of Carbon Estimates: Hearing 
Before the Subcommittee On Energy Policy, Health Care And Entitlements of the Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, 113th Cong. 17–19 (2013) (questioning of Howard 
Shelanski, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management 
and Budget, regarding the omission of the 7% rate). 
 158. The public comment period ended in January of 2014. 
 159. S. Res. 512, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 160. Id. at 4. 
 161. See OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 35–36 (summarizing criticisms of A-4’s 
method of valuing intergenerational benefits). 
 162. E.g., supra notes 141–144. 
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would have produced better results is taken up below.  But, as a 
threshold matter, this “inconsistency” criticism is easily and 
completely answered with: “so what?”  No outside group or legislator 
is entitled to have the agencies comply with A-4, which are OMB’s 
purely internal guidelines and which were never promulgated as a 
rule or enacted as a law.163  Even E.O. 12,866, A-4’s parent executive 
order, is not enforceable by anyone outside the executive branch.164  
With the stroke of a pen, President Obama could eliminate E.O. 
12,866’s CBA requirements, which only exist and persist by executive 
fiat. 
This simple principle seems to elude many of the most powerful 
and influential critics of the SCC.  For example, in one of the oddest 
examples of lawmakers seeming to misunderstand this simple 
procedural matter, the House passed H.R. 1582, The Energy 
Consumers Relief Act of 2013.165  Included in the passed version of 
the bill was the Murphy Amendment, which provided: 
 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any executive order, 
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency may 
not use the social cost of carbon in order to incorporate social 
benefits of reducing carbon dioxide emissions, or for any other 
reason, in any cost-benefit analysis relating to an energy-related 
rule that is estimated to cost more than $1 billion unless and until a 
Federal law is enacted authorizing such use.166 
 
Even if this bill were to become law, OMB could unilaterally 
revoke A-4 and thereby eliminate the need for formalized CBA (and 
with it, the need for the SCC) in RIAs altogether.  No legislative 
CBA requirement exists that could stop President Obama’s Climate 
 
 163. See Sunstein, Thirty-Six Questions, supra note 29, at 172 (explaining that A-4 is an 
authoritative document that sets out only internal requirements and is not a law). 
 164. This is fortunate since, for the reasons described in Part III, E.O. 12,866 is literally 
impossible to comply with fully.  If outside actors could block regulations that do not comply 
fully with every provision in 12,866, this would shut down rulemaking.  Exec. Order No. 12,866, 
58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (“This Executive order is intended only to improve the 
internal management of the Federal Government and does not create any right or benefit, 
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United States, its 
agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person.”); see also Chen v. 
Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331, 1339 (4th Cir. 1995) (“A court should not enforce an executive order 
intended for the internal management of the President’s cabinet.”); Sunstein, Thirty-Six 
Questions, supra note 29, at 172. 
 165. See supra note 155. 
 166. Id. 
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Action Plan from proceeding.  The current, central role of formal, 
quantified CBA in the rulemaking process only exists at the pleasure 
of the President.  No stakeholder outside the executive branch is 
entitled to demand compliance with E.O. 12,866,167 let alone to insist 
on compliance with the flawed methodological guidelines 
implementing it.168 
C. Criticism of SCC for Not “Following the Rules” of A-4: The Merits 
of the Substantive Case 
Although, for the reasons described above, the administration 
has absolutely no obligation to require agency compliance with A-4, 
this subpart evaluates the substance of the A-4 provisions at issue.  
The following criticism of the SCC, taken from joint comments of 
eleven conservative think tanks, is representative of similar criticism 
that has come from legislators, academics, interest groups, and think 
tank analysts:169 
 
The IWG chose not to use a 7% discount rate to calculate the 
present value of future CO2 emission reductions, and not to report 
separate SCC values for the U.S. domestic economy.  Those choices 
inflate the hypothetical value of CO2 emission reductions and 
conflict with OMB Circular A-4.170 
 
These two recurring complaints, that the IWG should have used a 7% 
discount rate and that it should have reported separate SCC values 
that excluded non-U.S. damages, will be taken up in turn. 
1. Discount Rates for Climate Benefits Are, if Anything, Too High 
a. Reporting Only Rates that Are Lower than 7% Is Correct 
The decisions the United States makes now, regarding domestic 
and global mitigation and adaptation policies, will help determine 
 
 167. See Sunstein, Thirty-Six Questions, supra note 29, at 172 (explaining that E.O. 12,866 
and A-4 as authoritative documents “bind executive agencies even though they lack the force of 
law.”). 
 168. See id. 
 169. See supra notes 142–145. 
 170. Comment on the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Notice: Technical Support 
Documents: Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis under Executive 
Order No. 12866, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (Feb. 26, 2014) available at http:// 
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=OMB-2013-0007-0101. 
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what the world will be like centuries into the future.  For agency 
analysts completing CBAs for regulations addressing climate change, 
this creates a logically and ethically difficult accounting problem.  
Due to the enormous time lag between current social costs and the 
time when some of the distant future benefits will be experienced, the 
discount rate—the rate used to convert future costs and benefits to 
present value in CBA—is extremely powerful in the SCC analysis.  If 
the lives and wellbeing of people who live 300 years from now are 
discounted at the rates agencies use for shorter-term, infra-
generational analyses, then almost no weight at all will be given to the 
welfare of the distant future.  As A-4 itself acknowledges, 
intergenerational discounting creates difficult normative questions of 
justice and fairness that economics cannot objectively solve.171 
Broadly speaking, there are three rationales for discounting 
intangible benefits at rates as high as 3% and 7%, which A-4 specifies 
as appropriate for most domestic regulations.  They are: (1) 
descriptive discounting, in which discount rates are understood to 
reflect people’s actual preference for obtaining regulatory benefits 
sooner rather than later;172 (2) prescriptive discounting, where the 
discount rate is intended to reflect our best ethical judgment about 
what future benefits ought to be worth to us;173 and (3) opportunity 
cost discounting, where the discount rate is justified by the foregone 
benefits of other competing investments not undertaken.174 
The first place to look for insight into how a regulation’s benefits 
should be discounted is the statute under whose authority the 
regulation is to be promulgated.  Statutes used to protect the distant 
future, like the Clean Air Act, generally have protective intentions.  
Thus, for the regulatory benefits of climate change mitigation, this 
inquiry will generally yield a “prescriptive” rate or “growth” rate.175  
Both the prescriptive and growth rates would be lower than the 3% 
rate specified in A-4.176 
In the climate change context, the principal objections to very 
 
 171. See OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 35–36 (discussing various techniques that 
can be used in intergenerational discounting). 
 172. Revesz & Shahabian, supra note 109, at 1107. 
 173. Id. at 1104. 
 174. See id. at 1110 (discussing opportunity cost discounting). 
 175. See id. at 1109 (estimating that growth discounting would lead to an intergenerational 
discount rate of 2.4%). 
 176. See id. at 1104–06, 1109 (describing estimates of growth and prescriptive discount rates, 
the latter of which is frequently posited to be zero). 
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low discounting—including the objection that agencies should 
consider the value of chimerical alternatives, such as immunizations 
programs, with higher “rates of return”—are incoherent outside the 
purely hypothetical context of an omnipotent global decision maker.  
When EPA is determining whether to allow power plants to inflict 
damage on the distant future, the agency has no power to divert any 
foregone regulatory compliance costs to alternative investments.  
Because such opportunity costs of not-actually-displaced, wholly 
theoretical social investments are not representative of actual 
opportunities agencies can elect, they are not legitimate reasons to 
devalue the harms agency regulations seek to avoid. 
A problem with CBA is that very low discount rates may appear 
too low to use for costs.  To the extent these are monetary costs or 
actual market goods, they are conventionally investible or 
consumable and do have a time value that reflects this.  This means it 
might not make intuitive sense to devalue short-term monetary costs 
at the same rate as distant benefits, even if the analyst chooses to 
assign some discount rate to each. 
One solution is to use a declining discount rate.177  Another is to 
simply use different rates for different CBA inputs, as described 
below. 
b. Differential Discounting Within RIAs Is Not “Absurd” 
In 2010, after reviewing both the existing literature and the 
applicable OMB guidelines on cost-benefit analysis, the IWG 
promoted the use of a 3% discount rate for carbon emissions.  While 
it also reported values at a 2.5% rate and a 5% rate, agencies have 
largely adopted the 3% “central estimate.”178  The primary support in 
the literature for the 3% rate comes from assessing alternative rates 
of return on displaced consumption.  In other words, it is a rate 
premised on the economic value of the costs of regulation.  However, 
once one accepts that the discount rate used for costs need not be 
identical to the rate used for benefits,179 then a discrete logical and/or 
 
 177. See generally M. Weitzman & C. Gollier, How Should the Distant Future be Discounted 
When Discount Rates are Uncertain?, 107 ECON. LETTERS 350 (2010) (concluding that discount 
rates must decline over time when “future discount rates are uncertain but have a permanent 
component.”). 
 178. See Masur & Posner, supra note 21, at 1561, 1566 (discussing agencies reliance on IWG 
discount rate of 3%). 
 179. See Luttrell, supra note 38, at 128 (concluding that OMB should “reconsider its long-
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normative justification for the application of a 3% rate to benefits is 
also needed.  The interagency committee does not supply such a 
justification, and what rationales exist in the literature for discounting 
intergenerational benefits at rates as high as 3% are unconvincing. 
Because the IWG did not compute an SCC at a 7% discount 
rate, commentators have complained that agencies cannot use a 
consistent discount rate in the CBAs prepared for OMB review at the 
7% rate.  As one critic argued: 
 
We thus have an absurd situation, in which EPA and other 
regulatory agencies will be following the rules and calculating 
benefits and costs at both the 3 percent and 7 percent discount 
rates. Yet, when they express the “social benefits” of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions at the 7 percent rate, they are actually 
going to plug in the wrong number, and explain in a footnote why 
they are doing so.180 
 
As I demonstrate in an earlier paper, The Case for Differential 
Discounting, it is simply not true that all benefits considered in CBAs 
must always be discounted at the same rate as costs to avoid perverse 
or absurd outcomes.181  While this type of discounting is now an 
unusual practice, that doesn’t make it wrong.  Again, entrenched is 
not the same as correct. 
It is true that because the IWG did not report SCC values at the 
7% discount rate, agencies will no longer be discounting all “goods” 
at 7%.  Nevertheless, if the best reason to continue discounting non-
commodity benefits—no matter what they are, and even if they are 
already reported and discounted separately from other inputs—at a 
7% rate is that “A-4 says so” or that it is “standard practice,” then it 
would be better to abandon this practice. 
2. Reporting Global Benefits Is Appropriate 
Many have argued the SCC should omit considering impacts 
outside of the United States, including externalized harms suffered by 
 
standing directive that executive agencies must always discount health and environmental 
benefits at the same rate as monetary costs”). 
 180. Robert P. Murphy, Working Group Broke the Rules with Its ‘Social Cost of Carbon’ 
Estimate, AMERICAN PRODUCTS, AMERICAN POWER (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www. 
productsandpower.org/2013/08/19/working-group-broke-the-rules-with-its-social-cost-of-carbon-
estimate/. 
 181. Luttrell, Differential Discounting, supra note 38. 
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developing nations.182  Since this furor has been largely focused on 
EPA’s regulations of power plants under section 111 of the Clean Air 
Act, this analysis will focus on those rules as well. 
There are two principal objections to including foreign lives in 
the SCC estimate.  The first, and the most common objection, is that 
agencies are required by government guidelines (meaning A-4) to 
calculate a domestic estimate; the second is that EPA lacks the 
authority to regulate for the benefit of foreign lives.  Once these 
objections are addressed, the basic question resolves to a simple 
ethical one: in its assessments of the social value of regulatory 
options, should the United States consider the global commons as a 
free waste dump, except to the extent this dumping directly harms 
Americans? 
For the reasons described above, the first objection to reporting 
global benefits in assessing climate change regulations is easily 
refuted.  A-4, a purely internal guideline to executive agencies that 
was created ten years ago by executive fiat, does not bind the Obama 
administration.  If OMB allows the practice, then there is nothing that 
prohibits agencies from including foreign benefits in the cost-benefit 
analyses they prepare for OMB.  Indeed, other federal agencies have 
included foreign costs and benefits in regulatory CBAs when these 
values were important and quantifiable.183  Moreover, agencies are not 
required to exclude regulatory compliance costs borne by foreign 
 
 182. See Murphy, Power Plant Rule Fails Administration’s Own Cost/Benefit Test, supra note 
23 (arguing that SCC estimates should focus on benefit to Americans rather than global benefit 
from reduction in climate change); see also U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE: INSTITUTE FOR 21ST 
CENTURY, ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF POTENTIAL NEW CARBON DIOXIDE REGULATIONS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 46–48 (2014) (discussing the impact of regulating CO2 emissions on 
Americans, while neglecting to consider the impact CO2 emission regulations will have on 
developing nations), available at http://www.energyxxi.org/sites/default/files/file-
tool/Assessing_the_Impact_of_ Potential_New_Carbon_Regulations_in_the_United_States.pdf; 
The ‘Social Cost of Carbon: Some Surprising Facts: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Env’t and 
Pub. Works, supra note 23, at 6–7 (discussing OMB guidance requiring the SCC to be estimated 
from a domestic rather than a global perspective). 
 183. ENVTL. DEF. FUND ET AL., COMMENTS ON TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: 
TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 
UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12,866 (Feb. 26, 2014), available at 
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/global_warming/Joint-Comments-to-OMB.pdf (citing 
Unique Device Identification System, 78 Fed. Reg. 58,786 (Sept. 24, 2013)); Standards for the 
Growing, Harvesting, Packing, and Holding of Produce for Human Consumption, 78 Fed. Reg. 
3504 (Jan. 16, 2013) (including costs to foreign farms); U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER 
PROTECTION REGULATORY AGENDA, RIN 1651-AA96 DEFINITION OF FORM I-94 TO 
INCLUDE ELECTRONIC FORMAT (2013) (estimating preliminary net benefits to foreign travelers 
and carriers). 
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companies doing business in the United States.184 
The second objection concerns agencies’ legal authority to 
consider foreign lives when setting standards.  In regards to EPA’s 
use of the SCC in its CBA of the proposed regulation of existing 
power plants, Professor Eric Posner argues that “96% of the global 
population lives outside the United States.  Obama lacks any clear 
authority to regulate for their benefit.”185 
The relevant provisions in the Clean Air Act call on EPA to 
regulate “air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to 
endanger public health or welfare.”186  There is nothing in this 
language or in the Clean Air Act that expressly limits EPA to 
regulating exclusively on behalf of Americans.  It would be perverse 
if, although EPA has statutory authority to promulgate regulations 
addressing “global warming,”187 it could not consider global benefits 
in the CBAs of those regulations. 
Even assuming, counterfactually, that EPA were required by 
statute to set standards that ignore impacts on other countries, the 
analyses it prepares for OMB review are not themselves establishing 
regulatory standards under the applicable statutes.  For example, the 
question of what is the “best available control technology” for a 
major stationary source of GHG pollution under section 111(b) of the 
Clean Air Act need not be determined by the results of EPA’s CBA. 
An influential article by Ted Gayer and Kip Viscusi argues that it 
may be a bad idea to evaluate regulations from a global perspective 
because, in the past, agencies generally have not done this, and we 
should proceed with great circumspection before making substantial 
changes from standard practice.188  Ultimately, the goal of these 
analyses is to estimate the welfare changes brought about by 
regulation.  Should we take the position that, moving forward, we will 
 
 184. See generally OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23 (stating that agencies are not 
required to exclude regulatory compliance costs borne by foreign companies doing business in 
the United States). 
 185. Eric Posner, Wrong Number: Obama’s New Climate Plan is Based on a Dubious 
Calculation and Falls Woefully Short, SLATE (July 9, 2013), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/07/obama_s_climate_action_plan_how_it_m
iscalculates_the_social_cost_of_carbon.single.html. 
 186. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2012). 
 187. See generally Massachusetts v. Envt’l Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (stating that 
the EPA can regulate greenhouse gases but cannot consider global benefits as part of its cost-
benefit analysis). 
 188. See generally GAYER & VISCUSI, supra note 19 (arguing that agencies should be careful 
when evaluating regulations from a global perspective as it has not previously been the standard 
practice). 
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only care about American welfare because that has been our 
tradition? 
If this is our tradition, it is an illegitimate one.  From a basic 
moral standpoint, the United States should not make policy decisions 
that rely on welfare analyses wherein most of the global harms the 
United States causes to human welfare are automatically set to zero.  
As a leading source of global GHG emissions, our energy policy is 
paid for, in part, by the current and future residents of vulnerable 
nations, like low-lying Bangladesh.  These nations should not be 
involuntarily conscripted to bear potentially catastrophic costs of the 
United States’ domestic energy policy. 
 One option is to add a footnote to the welfare analysis, 
explaining that the geographic areas considered in the calculation of 
costs and benefits are not identical.  This would be better than 
requiring illegitimate welfare analyses that assume an entitlement to 
treat other nations as free dumping grounds for our waste in the name 
of producing cleaner analyses. 
Another reason Mr. Gayer and Professor Viscusi argue against 
EPA’s recent consideration of global benefits is that “if applied 
broadly to all policies . . . [t]he global perspective would likely shift 
immigration policy to one of entirely open borders[.]”189  This is 
simply irrelevant since there are numerous good government 
practices that cannot be “applied broadly to all policies.”190  There is 
no reason that EPA’s considering global welfare in analyses of 
climate policy should have any effect on immigration policy. 
D. Certain OMG Methodological Guidelines Not Followed Would 
Have Increased the SCC 
Opponents of President Obama’s Climate Action Plan focus on 
the OMB rules that, quite appropriately, were not followed.  That is, 
the global scope of benefits and discount rate, as discussed in subpart 
C, above.  In contrast, little attention has been paid to common, 
OMB-endorsed CBA methodologies that should have been followed.  
These more correct methodologies would have increased SCC values. 
 
 189. Id. at 21. 
 190. Id. 
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1. Lives in Developing Nations Are Valued Less than U.S. Lives 
Within the Same Regulatory Analysis 
OMB states that “current agency practice provides a value of a 
statistical life (VSL) ranging from roughly $5 million to $9 million per 
statistical life” for agency CBAs.191  But the averted deaths in 
developing nations—whose monetized values are imported into 
agency CBAs via the SCC—are valued at a lower figure that is GDP-
dependent. 
In both its 2010 and 2013 Reports on the Social Cost of Carbon, 
the IWG relied on integrated assessment models (IAMs), which use 
scientific, economic, and risk projections to generate estimates of the 
monetized value of climate costs and benefits.192  In the IAMs relied 
on by the IWG in estimating the SCC, harms to human health are 
calculated as a percentage of GDP; the weight given to mortality and 
health harms (such as deaths and diminished quality of life as a result 
of illness) are thus significantly greater when the injured person lives 
in a country with a higher GDP.193  Horribly, under this practice the 
more climate change reduces a country’s GDP, the less its residents’ 
lives will be worth to save. 
In domestic debates over how much carbon pollution the United 
States should be externalizing, the only ethical answer to the question 
of how foreign lives should be valued is that they should be given at 
least as much weight as an American life.  This is the only defensible 
way to set a monetized value on the lives of people for whose deaths 
or quality of life impairment the United States bears responsibility.  
Human lives in developing countries, under certain CBA 
assumptions, are worth much less than domestic lives because—due 
principally to resource constraints—they are “willing to pay” (WTP) 
less for incremental risk reductions.194  However, the challenge faced 
 
 191. OIRA: A PRIMER, supra note 36, at 10. 
 192. 2010 TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SCC, supra note 147, at 5; 2013 TECHNICAL 
UPDATE OF THE SCC, supra note 148, at 2. 
 193. See Ethan Case, The Value of Statistical Life and the Social Cost Of Carbon (Apr. 
2013) (unpublished Masters thesis, Duke University), available at http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/ 
dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/6833/EthanCaseMP.pdf?sequence=1 (stating that this 
assessment is “a number intended to price the damage done to the economy by each ton of 
CO2”); see also 2010 TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SCC, supra note 147, at 8–10 
(explaining the method for monetizing the value of  costs and benefits in integrated assessment 
models). 
 194. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life in Legal Contexts: Survey and Critique, 2 AM. L. 
& ECON. REV. 195, 197–98 (2000) (arguing that lives in developing countries are worth less than 
domestic lives under certain CBA assumptions as these individuals are willing to pay less for 
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by the IWG is not to value WTP qua WTP; it is to create a monetized 
social value for this good so it may be weighed against the social costs 
of domestic regulation.  The normative nature of this exercise is 
unavoidable, since welfare economics is normative economics.195  The 
2013 increases to the SCC are an improvement, since they mean the 
US will consider climate change mitigation to be worth more in the 
domestic regulatory context.  But they are not enough.  In the next 
update to the SCC the IWG should consider the ways that the global 
nature of the IAM inputs might create injustice when used without 
upward adjustment in domestic RIAs that use higher values for 
similar damages to Americans. 
Thus, to be more just, IWG in its next report should adjust IAMs 
so that foreign lives are valued at a level at least equal to the value of 
domestic lives for the purposes of analyzing proposed domestic 
actions.196  Given the nature of the IAM inputs, it may prove difficult 
for the IWG to disaggregate the monetizations of health impacts so 
that they may be valued equally to harms to Americans.  
Nevertheless, to the extent this is possible for future SCC estimates, it 
would improve what is presently a very unjust practice.  In RIAs of 
domestic regulations, the US should not persist in assigning the lives 
of innocent people in developing nations, killed or harmed by U.S. 
emissions, a lesser value than the lives of their American 
counterparts. 
2. The Baseline for the SCC 
a. IWG’s Use of an IAM Model that Assumes Regulation Occurs 
A-4 states: “You need to measure the benefits and costs of a rule 
against a baseline.  This baseline should be the best assessment of the 
way the world would look absent the proposed action.”197  This 
directive, to use as a baseline the “status quo” world, is one that 
would have been sensible for the IWG to adopt.  While IWG is under 
no obligation to use A-4 methodologies, this is another example of an 
OMB methodology that would have been appropriate here, and one 
 
certain risk reductions). 
 195. JUST ET AL., supra note 17, at 3. 
 196. If it is strongly desired as an analytical preference that the geographical area for which 
costs are assessed equal the area for which benefits are assessed, then the area for which other 
regulatory costs and benefits are assessed might be expanded to the whole world. 
 197. OMB CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 23, at 15. 
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that would have raised the SCC if it had been followed. 
To generate its “marginal” SCC values, the IWG needed to 
make certain assumptions about future emissions.198  To facilitate this 
process, a set of future scenarios was averaged that included both 
business as usual (BAU) scenarios, and a scenario that assumed that 
relatively rapid action would be taken to reduce or slow GHG 
emissions rates.199 
For the suite of finalized and planned Obama administration 
regulations that address climate change,200 any SCC values generated 
using assumptions more optimistic than BAU for emissions are using 
the wrong baseline.  Unfortunately, the IWG’s SCC figures did 
incorporate estimates that assumed concerted global action to reduce 
emissions.201  When evaluating the costs and benefits of policies that 
would reduce emissions from the BAU baseline, it is illogical to use a 
model that assumes that any contemplated reductions from BAU will 
occur.  This is analogous to an attempt to assess the social value of 
incapacitating an actually at-large assassin under the assumption that 
she is already incapacitated—the monetized social value would be 
zero, not because there is no real social gain from stopping her, but 
because the calculus is based entirely upon an incorrect factual 
assumption. 
A more logical baseline from which to evaluate the current suite 
of regulatory actions on climate—and any subsequent domestic 
climate regulations and/or moves toward U.S. participation in 
concerted global action on climate—is a BAU baseline.  The IWG 
 
 198. The IWG also needed to make certain assumptions about future growth, in addition to 
setting other dependent assumptions.  To see this, consider attempting to assess the difference 
in social value of a metric ton of drinking water under different assumptions about scarcity: its 
value in the world where potable water is scarce would be very different from its value in a 
world where it is bountiful. 
 199. 2010 TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SCC, supra note 147, at 5. 
 200. See generally Cong. Research Service, Rep. No. R40506, Cars, Trucks, and Climate: 
EPA Regulation Of Greenhouse Gases From Mobile Sources (2014), available at http://fas.org/ 
sgp/crs/misc/R40506.pdf (describing the plan to issue a rule for new GHG emissions standards 
for mobile sources); see also BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION OF 
EXISTING POWER PLANTS UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT: KEY THEMES EMERGING FROM THE 
BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER’S WORKSHOP SERIES (2014), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/ 
default/files/files/BPC%20Energy%20Greenhouse%20Gas%20Regulation(1).pdf (discussing 
GHG regulations); U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-14-669R, ENERGY 
CONSERVATION PROGRAM: ENERGY CONSERVATION STANDARDS FOR COMMERCIAL AND 
INDUSTRIAL ELECTRIC MOTORS (2014), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664472.pdf 
(explaining energy conservation standards for electric motors). 
 201. See 2013 TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SCC, supra note 148, at 15 (explaining that 
the U.S.’s working in tandem with other countries warranted a global measure of estimates). 
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should not use a scenario that averages BAU scenarios with any 
scenarios that simply assume some of the emissions goals of the 
regulations will be achieved regardless of what course the regulator 
takes. 
One might argue that it is theoretically possible that concerted 
global effort could actually move the world off its BAU pathway 
without mitigation efforts from the United States.  Realistically, given 
the role of the United States in international diplomacy and its status 
as a leading GHG emitter, such a scenario seems too unlikely to be 
the basis of a substantial piece of a no-action baseline in the IWG 
models.202  In short, the IWG most likely underestimates the SCC, as 
applied to proposed climate mitigation measures, because it proposes 
the wrong baseline for climate regulations. 
3. The SCC May Underestimate the Compounding Effects of Major 
U.S. Climate Change Regulations 
A related issue that may cause agencies to underestimate climate 
benefits, and one that the IWG might improve in its next set of 
updates to the SCC, is that the IWG did not address how agencies 
should assess emissions changes that are greater than “marginal.”  
This static baseline is incompatible with the goal of U.S. climate 
change regulations, which, it is hoped, will have significantly more 
than a marginal impact on emissions.  According to the IWG: 
 
The purpose of the SCC estimates presented here is to make it 
possible for agencies to incorporate the social benefits from 
reducing carbon dioxide emissions into cost-benefit analyses of 
regulatory actions that have small, or ‘marginal,’ impacts on 
cumulative global emissions.203 
 
IAMs generate economic values for additional incremental 
emissions of carbon dioxide under various scenarios and assumptions. 
These models—three of which are the foundation of the IWG’s SCC 
values under both the original 2010 document and the 2013 technical 
update—enabled the IWG to generate estimates of the monetized 
 
 202. See Fei Teng & Shuang-Qing Xu, Definition of Business as Usual and Its Impacts on 
Assessment of Mitigation Efforts, 3 ADVANCES IN CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH 212, 213–17 
(2012) (discussing mitigation efforts by developed and developing countries). 
 203. 2010 TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SCC, supra note 147, at 2. 
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social cost of one additional metric ton of carbon.204 
Assuming that the IWG’s valuations are correct for a single 
metric ton, estimating the economic harm caused by emitting two 
billion metric tons of carbon (or the harm avoided by preventing the 
release of two billion metric tons of carbon) is far more complicated 
than merely multiplying the SCC figure for a single metric ton by two 
billion.  This is because the change that would occur if the policy was 
evaluated is not a marginal change in emissions.  Changes of this 
magnitude should alter assumptions in the model itself, and should 
change the SCC figures the model produces.205 
Plugging a static set of SCC figures into partial equilibrium 
analyses of a suite of regulations that would generate larger-than-
marginal changes in GHG output, violates the very basics of CBA 
theory.  In fact, the SCC should increase or decrease depending on 
how stringent the suite of regulations addressing GHG emissions is.  
This is the reason the IWG could only provide a value for marginal 
changes in emissions to be used in domestic RIAs. 
Given the enormous importance of U.S. mitigation efforts in 
enabling successful diplomatic strategies to address climate change, 
large mitigation may create opportunities to address climate change 
that the United States would otherwise not have had.  For this reason, 
the estimated total value of the Obama administration’s collective 
regulations to reduce carbon emissions is likely too low.206 
This discussion highlights a fundamental problem with CBA, one 
that cannot be resolved by improving flawed methodologies—though 
if CBA must be done, improving the CBA methodologies is 
absolutely necessary and worth doing.  The problem is this: real-world 
regulatory CBAs are necessarily flawed and incomplete,207 but even 
an idealized, textbook CBA208 must rely on the existence of 
equilibrium outside of the project or policy being assessed.209  OMB-
overseen CBAs, which depend for their validity on the assumptions 
necessary for “partial equilibrium analyses,” are simply not a good 
 
 204. Id.; see also 2013 TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SCC, supra note 148, at 2. 
 205. Kysar, supra note 22, at 60. 
 206.  This argument has also been made by other commentators.  E.g., id.; but see Posner, 
supra note 185 (suggesting that EPA restrictions on carbon dioxide emissions by power plants 
might send coal overseas for combustion). 
 207. E.g., Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 104. 
 208. For example, an analysis where changes in “consumer surplus” and “producer surplus” 
effectuated by policy changes are fully estimated and compared over time. 
 209. See JUST ET AL., supra note 17, at 46 (explaining that partial equilibrium analysis must 
focus on one factor at a time and assume that all other factors are unaffected). 
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way to make regulatory decisions for major rules affecting public 
health or the environment.  CBA is especially unhelpful for decisions 
affecting climate policy, where none of the key factors—including 
many assumed to be constant or fixed in CBAs—are real-world 
constants that can be assessed in isolation from each other or 
assumed to remain stable.  The CBA model is by definition 
inapplicable. 
While the 2013 updates to the IWG’s SCC numbers represent an 
improvement over the lower 2010 figures, a switch to a less 
formalized variety of regulatory analysis is required.  This new 
regulatory analysis must be less dependent on highly monetized CBA 
in order to make the process rational and coherent. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In issuing E.O. 12,866, President Clinton intended to relax the 
Reagan-era focus on CBA in regulatory review.210  Unfortunately, 
standard setting continues instead to drift toward a de facto 
“maximize monetized net benefits” decision criterion that is at odds 
with many widely shared societal values, including those values 
animating the very statutes whose regulations are being assessed.211 
U.S. public policy commitments—as embodied in the legislation 
being implemented—should determine the way agencies evaluate 
environmental and public health regulations.  The reverse should not 
be true.  A small group of policy analysts’ ideological commitments to 
certain methodologies should not be prompting agencies to make 
choices that run counter to the protective environmental and public 
health statutes these agencies are charged with carrying out. 
Defects in A-4, combined with increased requirements that 
agencies follow A-4’s controversial methodologies, result in 
implementation of E.O. 12,866 in a way that gives inadequate 
purchase to the deontological concerns expressly recognized as 
deserving protection by the Order’s language.  Despite its “gold 
standard” reputation, A-4 is not a policy-neutral operationalization of 
 
 210. See supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text (outlining the more holistic analysis 
intended in E.O 12,866). 
 211. Shapiro, supra note 57, at 10435–36 (citing FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, 
PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004)) 
(supporting the proposition that “benefits, like environmental goods and the value of a life, are 
inherently difficult to value, and, therefore, the benefits of regulations protecting these goods 
are underestimated whereas costs are easily quantified and hence given a greater weight.”). 
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E.O. 12,866.  It was produced in a procedurally defective process, and 
it is not the best way to do a welfare analysis, if one is to be done. 
Conventional regulatory CBA is simply the wrong tool to assess 
climate policy, and A-4’s continuing influence on analyses of climate 
change regulations is increasingly dangerous.  Applying A-4’s 
requirements even more strictly, as proposed by some policymakers, 
could thwart urgently needed efforts to address an urgent and utterly 
monumental threat.   
The IWG’s recent increases to its estimated SCC are an 
improvement.  However, in order to make the regulatory review 
process more rational and coherent, it is necessary to have a less 
formalized variety of regulatory analysis.  Regulatory analysis would 
better inform regulatory decisions in the climate change arena if it 
were less dependent on highly monetized CBA and instead put all 
legitimate policy concerns (including the full panoply of 
consequentialist and deontological concerns enumerated in E.O. 
12,866 and the full range of concerns that animate the statutes being 
implemented) on-screen in a coherent way.  The primary goal of this 
more rational analysis would be to enable what is known about the 
full range of concerns to be evaluated and balanced by the agencies—
which are, after all, the bodies to which Congress actually delegated 
the task of rulemaking—instead of by a defective algorithm. 
